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B.A. 1975, Yale University; M.A. 1977, Victoria University of Wellington (New
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This article is copyrighted by the author, Eric M. Freedman, who retains
all rights thereto. Permission is hereby granted to nonprofit institutions to
reproduce this work for educational use, provided that copies are distributed
at or below cost and identify the author and this publication.
I am solely responsible for the contents of this piece, including certain
deviations from the forms prescribed by The Bluebook: A Uniform System
of Citation (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015) which
have been made at my insistence in the interests of clarity and to facilitate
document retrieval by future researchers. For clarification purposes I have
also sometimes regularized the capitalization and punctuation in quotations
from early sources.
By way of disclosure, I have served as a member of the legal teams pursuing
writs of habeas corpus in several of the cases from the current century cited
in this article. By way of acknowledgement, I have benefitted greatly from the
insights of my co-counsel.
This work owes a special debt to the collegial support of John Phillip Reid
and William E. Nelson of New York University Law School.
Much of the research underlying this article was conducted in the New
Hampshire State Archives in Concord during a year-long leave generously
funded by Hofstra Law School. The time would have been far less productive
(and enjoyable) without the absolutely extraordinary assistance I received from
Frank C. Mevers, then the State Archivist, Brian Nelson Burford, then the State
Records Manager (now the State Archivist), and John Penney, Armand Dubois,
Peter Falzone, William G. Gardner, Benoit Shoja, Pam Hardy, Georgia-Rose
Angwin, and Stephen Thomas of the Archives staff. Milli S. Knudsden, a New
Hampshire independent scholar who was volunteering at the Archives while
I was there, and volunteer Karol Yalcin were responsible for finding a number
of the documents that I have relied upon. My work on the New Hampshire
materials has also been enriched by the insights of Mary Susan Leahy, Esq.,
Robert B. Stein, Esq., Eugene Van Loan, Esq., and Richard M. Lambert.
Copies of the documents from the New Hampshire State Archives that
undergird my descriptions of the cases are available from the reference desk of
the Hofstra Law School Library. Some of these records, including ones cited
to Provincial Case Files and the Judgment Books of the Superior Court, have
also previously been microfilmed by the Genealogical Society of Utah.
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Project Overview
This is the third of three planned articles in a project whose
overall title is "Habeas Corpus in Three Dimensions." The first
installment discussed the importance of habeas corpus as a common
law writ. 2 The second piece considered the significance of the fact
that American habeas corpus until the first decades of the nineteenth
century was embedded in a system of multiple constraints on
government power.3 This article broadly overviews habeas corpus
within the horizontal aspect 4 of the system of checks and balances
5
that developed here subsequently.
I. Introduction: Habeas Corpus and the IndependentJudiciary
"Separation of powers" differs from "checks and balances."
One protects individual liberty by allocating particular governmental
powers to specific branches. The other protects individual liberty by
having each branch restrain the others. Part II.A makes this point
and Part II.B shows that allocation of powers, enforced by judges,
was an established feature of British government in the North
American colonies. The concept of allocation of powers "passed
uncontroversially into American law."6
Checks and balances, though, was a new idea 7 and its

2
3
4
5

6
7

See Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus as a Common Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 591 (2011) [hereinafter Freedman I].
See Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus as a Legal Remedy, 8 NE. U. LJ. 1 (2016)
[hereinafter Freedman 1I].
See infra note 7 (discussing this limitation).
As Markus Dubber has observed, the historical literature on habeas corpus
has neglected the question of how the English writ was incorporated over
time into 'American legal institutions and practices," and how this issue bears
on "the oft-invoked but rarely-substantiated notion of Anglo-American' law."
Markus D. Dubber, The SchizophrenicJury and Other Palladiaof Liberty 11, (Apr.
12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm? abstract id =2593563).
Freedman 1I,supra note 3, at 72.
See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text,
Imperial Contexts, andAmerican Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 673 (2008).
Federalism as a conscious means of structuring government for the
protection of rights was also a new idea. In "the compound republic of America"
a "double security arises to the rights of the people" because there are checks
and balances operating vertically as well as horizontally. See THE FEDERALI ST,
No. 51, at 323 James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See also Coleman
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acceptance was not possible until the judicial branch established
its republican legitimacy.' As Part III.A describes, "judicial
independence got off to quite a rocky start in the new nation both
because the judges were so closely identified with the Crown and
because the common law they administered had no plainly visible
democratic source." 9 The result was rampant legislative interference
with judicial decision-making (Part III.B), built into the initial
architecture of judicial systems (Part III.B. 1) and often furthered by
abolishing disfavored courts (Part III.B.2), by pressuring individual
judges (Part III.B.3), or by intervening in specific cases (Part III.B.4).
The notion of an independent judiciary that restrained the
other branches was still aborning in 1807, when John Marshall
stated in dicta in Ex Parte Bollman' ° - quite wrongly as a matter of
both British history and American constitutional law" - that federal
courts had no inherent authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus
in the absence of legislation granting them that power. As Part III.C
emphasizes in recounting Bollman, the opinion was delivered at a
time when the judicial branch was substantially subordinate to the
others, 2 "a period of profound uncertainty, experimentation, and

8

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing
federalism as a device whose purpose is to secure "to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power"). The present article, however,
confines itself to horizontal checks and balances. See generally infra note 178.
See KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY

9

65-67 (2d ed. 2009).

Freedman 1I, supra note 3, at 5.

See

MARY

SARAH BILDER, THE

TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
EMPIRE 190-91

(2005);

JED HANDELSMAN

SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S

COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 31

10

8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).

11

See

ERIC

M.

(2012).

FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT

OF LIBERTY 20-41 (2003) (arguing these positions); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 295 (2d ed.

1995) (explaining that "an Englishman's rights existed in the maxims of the
common law and nature, whatever Parliament did or did not say," making law
"basically what the principles of right reason declared to be law, the codification
of which was hardly inclusive"); Richard L.Aynes, Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning
of Privileges and/orImmunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1295, 1320-23 (2009);
Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 683, 698; infra text accompanying notes 19096. See generally Douglas E. Edlin, A ConstitutionalRight toJudicialReview: Access
to Courts and Ouster Clauses in England and the United States, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
67, 82-85, 99-102 (2009).

12

See

R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL OF AARON BURR: LAW

POLITICS AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT 5
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contingency."' 3
In succeeding decades, the shifting theoretical and
institutional structure of checks and balances came to rest.
Part IV.A describes the converging forces which resulted
in the judiciary, after a period of struggle on multiple fronts,
establishing its institutional independence from the legislature
and solidifying a cultural expectation that executive officers would
comply with judicial decisions. This accomplishment came at a cost:
juries lost autonomy inside the judicial structure, and their power
was weakened permanently (Part IV.B).
Once the idea of judicial independence as an aspect of checks
and balances had become accepted legally, respectable intellectually,
and defensible politically, the judicial branch 14 should have reclaimed
in the context of habeas corpus its inherent authority to police the
limits of executive power,'5 this time in order to enforce structural
as well as individual concerns. 6 But the Supreme Court proved

13

14

15

16

(2012) (noting that at the time "judicial authority and independence had yet
to be established, at both the state and national levels"); infra Part III.B.
Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 401, 456
(2005). See also Freedman II, supra note 3, at 26-30 (noting inter-branch
contests regarding writ).
This does not necessarily mean "judges." As recounted in Freedman I, supra
note 2, at 600 n.47, 600-01, 603 & n.58, there are numerous examples from the
early national period of jury trials in habeas corpus actions or their functional
equivalents. Moreover, actions of that kind should not be considered in
isolation from other legal remedies for wrongful imprisonment (e.g. public
and private criminal prosecutions, damages actions for false imprisonment
or malicious prosecution), in all of which the jury played a central role. See
Freedman II, supra note 3, at 32-67. Cf Douglas A. Berman, Makingthe Framer's
Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OH IO
ST. LJ. 887, 912-15 (2010) (relying on jury control over law in founding
era to support jury participation in modern statutory habeas proceedings).
Discussions of the evolution of the jury's role appear infra in note 97 and Part
IV.B.
See Freedman I, supra note 2, at 607-08, 608 n.86, 611 n.99; Freedman II,
supra note 3, at 5-6; Lee Kovarsky, A ConstitutionalTheory of Habeas Power, 98
VA. L. REV. 753, 757-58 (2013). In successfully overcoming Executive Branch
resistance on foreign policy grounds to the release of the slaves petitioning
for habeas corpus in The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841), John Quincy
Adams connected "the effective power of the habeas corpus" to "the power
and independence of the judiciary itself." See Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus
Pastand Present, 59 FED. LAw. 40, 41 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, Past and
Present].
See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222-23 (2010) (unanimous) (noting
that checks and balances serve to protect both the liberties of the individual
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hesitant to repudiate Bollman's dangerously flaccid view of the writ, 17

notwithstanding that history and policy alike called upon it to take
that step.' 8
Finally, as Part V describes, in 2008 in Boumediene v. Bush,' 9
a landmark ruling that put it on the right side of history - the Court
recognized habeas corpus as an instrument for the enforcement
of checks and balances, 20 and the power to issue it as inherent in

17

18

and the prerogatives of the three branches); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 536-37 (2004) (stating that "the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the
Judicial Branch to play [its] necessary role in maintaining [the] delicate balance
of governance," as well as protecting citizens' rights); FREEDMAN, supra note
11, at 6; William R. Casto, If Men Were Angels, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
663, 663-64 (2012). See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A
HISTORICAL INQUIRY 8 (2007).
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13, 304 n.24 (2001) (recognizing issue
but resting ruling on statutory grounds); Noriega v. Pastrana, 559 U.S. 917,
924 n.4 (2010) (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(describing St. Cyr); FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 3-4 (criticizing St. Cyr for
not repudiating Bollman). Cf.James Oldham & Michael J. Wishnie, The Historical
Source of Habeas Corpus and INS v. St. Cyr, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 499-500
(2002) (concluding that St. Cyr inferentially ruled in favor of inherent judicial
authority to issue writ). A more recent statement of Professor Oldham's views
appears in James Oldham, Habeas Corpus,Legal History, and GuantanamoBay, 36
MANITOBA L.J. 361 (2012).
Earlier, even Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), a famous ode to the writ
delivered by Justice Brennan, explicitly reserved the question of whether it was
"the Framers' understanding that congressional refusal to permit the federal
courts to accord the writ its full common-law scope as we have described it
might constitute an unconstitutional suspension of the privilege of the writ,"
although commenting that "[t]here have been some intimations of support
for such a proposition in decisions of this Court." Id. at 406.
See Halliday & White, supranote 7, at 683; Eric M. Freedman, The Bush Military
Tribunals: WhereHave We Been? WhereAre We Going?, 17 CR. JUST. 14, 20 (2002).
See also Dan Poulson, Note, Suspensionfor Beginners: Ex Parte Bollman and the
Unconstitutionality of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 35
HASTINGS CON ST.

19
20

L.Q. 373, 398 (2008) ("[I]f the Great Writ is to have any

meaning as a formidable restraint on tyranny and arbitrary confinement, it
must be free from substantive limitation by the body that most fears it.").
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See Martin J.Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping:The

Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25

CONST. COMMENT.

377, 378

(2009) (concluding that after centuries of avoidance, "Boumediene represents
a timely restoration of a healthy balance of power"); Emily Garcia Uhrig,
Boumediene v. Bush, the Great Writ, and the Power to "Say What the Law Is," 33
OKLA. CITY

U. L.

REV.

389, 390 (2009) ("The decision, at its core, is an

affirmation of separation of powers principles. It affirms the Framers' creation
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the Article III judicial role. This welcome development dispelled a
distorted vision of the past that held the potential to cloud clear
thinking in facing the problems of the future, including those posed
by the struggle against terrorism.2'
II. Background: British Judicial Enforcement of Separation of
Powers
A. Allocation of Roles in British Governments
Although it is sometimes loosely said that the English system
had no separation of powers, this is imprecise. 22
"Separation of powers" as we know it today consists of:
(a.) assigning duties to the government instrumentality best
able to perform them, taking into account both efficiency and policy
considerations. Thus, for example, courts not cabinets should try
criminal charges against individuals. This concept, whose focus is
at the level of the particular governmental action at issue, might be
'23
called "allocation of roles.
(b.) assigning duties to various branches in furtherance of the
structural purpose of having them limit each others' power.24 This
concept, whose focus is at the architectural level, is encapsulated in
the American term "checks and balances." Its premise, in general, is
that requiring interaction between the branches before any problem
can be finally disposed of will lead to decisionmaking that is both
substantively sounder and more consistent with the goals of a

21
22

23
24

of a tripartite system of government in which each branch checks and balances
the others.") (footnote omitted); infra Part V.
See FREEDMAN, supra note 18, at 19.
This paragraph and the one that follow are drawn from Freedman 1I, supra
note 3, at 71-73. The terminological vagueness described in the text is quite
common, extending to the Court and commentators on its work, see, e.g., infra
note 261 and accompanying text.
Aziz Huq has given this principle the name "institution matching." See Aziz
Z. Huq, The InstitutionMatching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 417 (2012).
See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 320-22 James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (advocating "giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments
of the others .... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interests
of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.").
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representative non-tyrannical government than giving a single branch
25
the first and last word.
The British system of government in the North American
colonies understood and largely respected allocation of roles. The
distribution of powers to particular officials, which judges and juries
enforced through habeas and other legal remedies, had the effect of
insuring that individuals were treated justly and in accordance with
law. 26 Indeed, because the sovereign was presumed to desire that the
law be obeyed, 27 subjects could judicially invoke the law against the
28
Crown itself.
Plural office-holding was common in both England and early
America. 29 But, as shown below, the officeholders took seriously the
differences among their official roles. The result from the viewpoint
of prisoners was that both release and confinement could be ordered
by a variety of political actors but only within a judicially-sanctioned

25

26
27
28

29

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-37 (2004) (criticizing government's
view of "separation of powers" as one that "would turn our system of checks
and balances on its head"); see also Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving
Separationof Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 520 n.1 1 (2015) ("Separation
of powers and checks and balances have distinct meanings.").
See JOHN PHILLIP REID, RULE OF LAW: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY
IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 6 (2004).
See Timothy Endicott, Habeas Corpus and GuantanamoBay: A View From Abroad,
52 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 28-29 (2009).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("In Great Britain
the king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails
to comply with the judgment of his court.").
See Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 253, 253 (1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins ofJudicialReviewRevisited,
or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 787,
803 (1999).
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framework. The judiciary policed the boundaries of the powers of
31
executive officers 30 up to and including the sovereign.
1. The Governor and Council
As illustrated by the four cases presented below, a colonial
governor and his council might interact in a number of ways with
the judicial system regarding a detention.
1. Early in September 1750, an Indian by the name of
Nambrous 32 was incarcerated on complaint of one Moses Winget of
Dover, New Hampshire, who claimed that Nambrous had "attempted
to kill him the said Winget with a knife by stabbing him in the arm
'33
and body.

30

31
32

Those are the officers who are the focus of this Part of the article. Much of the
important early development of habeas corpus in England took place in the
context of King's Bench establishing its role as against that of other courts,
generating rules which were later expanded to restrain King and Council. See
PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 13976 (2010). The American colonies lacked "the tangle of ecclesiastical courts,
marshal's courts, corporation courts, and many other courts that existed in
the home country," Freedman I, supra note 2, at 613 n. 112, and thus the first
aspect of the story was less salient here. Colonial prisoners indeed obtained
release by challenging the jurisdiction of the committing court but the writ
by which they did so was at least as likely to be denominated "supersedeas"
or "certiorari" or "prohibition" as "habeas corpus." There is a full discussion
in Freedman I, supra note 2, at 597-608. See generally Kovarsky supra note 15,
at 800-02 (discussing Supreme Court's 19th century use of habeas corpus in
conjunction with certiorari to review criminal convictions).
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 71-73, 80-81, 97-98,
101, 113-14, 194-217, 234 (2008); infra Part II.A.2.
The name appears in the records under a variety of spellings. I have chosen this
one to be consistent with the one that appears in 6 PROVINCIAL PAPERS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE 8-9 (Nathaniel Bouton ed., 1872) (reprinting documents
quoted in this section of text). See also GEORGE WADLEIGH, NOTABLE
EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF DOVER NEW HAMPSHIRE: FROM THE FIRST

33

SETTLEMENT IN 1623 TO 1865, at 144 (Tufts Coll. Press, 1913) (using this
spelling in providing brief account of episode).
Relations between the colonists and the Indians have of course been the
subject of extensive scholarship. For two recent historiographical summaries
see Christopher Bilodeau, Indians in Southern New England: Older Paradigmsand
Newer Themes, 39 REVS. AM. HIST. 213 (2011) and Edward Countryman,
Toward a Different IroquoisHistory, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 347 (2012).
Mittimus of Indian, Sept. 8, 1750, Provincial Case File No. 027045, New
Hampshire State Archives. The documentation shows that Nambrous was
accompanied during his captivity by a female companion who was also wounded.
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When, however, the case came up later in the month the
ruling was, "No evidence appearing against him the said Indian to
convict him it is considered by the Court that the said Indian be
acquitted and discharged. ' 34 Yet, the order continued, "inasmuch as
the Indian nations are making war upon his majesty's subjects in
New England therefore ordered that his Excellency the Governour be
informed of this Court's order to discharge the said Indian and that
this Court can hold him no longer to the intent that his Excellency
'3
may take order as he shall see fit concerning him.
Later that day a copy of this order was presented to the
Governor and Council, and "in as much as the tribe to which the said
Indian belongs having committed hostilities against his Majesty's
subjects of neighbouring governments 36 the Council advised his
Excellency to give the Sheriff orders to detain the said Indian and
his squaw that is now with him till further order of the Governour
and Council. ' 37 They were detained accordingly until the following
38
February.
2. In December 1752 Ebenezer Ayres was indicted for

34
35
36

37

38

See Benjamin Pitman's Account of Keeping Indian, Sept. 1750, Provincial Case
File No.06756, New Hampshire State Archives (jailkeeper's account seeking
reimbursement for boarding "the Indian man three weeks," "the Indian woman
two weeks," and "rum for dressing their wounds"); Treasury Records, RG V,
Box 6, Accounts 1750, New Hampshire State Archives (accounting of Drs.
Sargent & Dearborn seeking payment for treating wounds of "Nimberos (an
Indian)" and "Ditto for Squaws Wounds").
Superior Court Minute, Sept. 26, 1750, Superior Court Minute Book Aug. 1750
& Feb. 1751 Terms, New Hampshire State Archives.
Id.
This may be a reference to an incident in Maine reported in Letter from Richard
Waldron to [New Hampshire Governor] Jonathan Belcher (Sept. 10, 1750),
M-1833-001, New Hampshire Historical Society Library ("Richmond fort was
attacked by the Indians last week, who continued their fire two days and then
went down the river and captured 14 people on an island. Tis reported that
some are killed.").
Minutes of Council Meeting of Sept. 26, 1750, 6 Council Book Minutes, at
63, New Hampshire State Archives. A slightly garbled version appears in the
printed papers cited supra note 32.
The evidence for this statement is that the jailkeeper's executor sought
reimbursement from the Assembly for lodging the pair based on a memo
found among the decedent's papers reading, "1750 September 3d - The Indians
was bro't to his Maj'ys Gaol and they were discharged the 23d day of February
following." See Petition of Joseph Mead to the New Hampshire Assembly,
Petitions Index, New Hampshire State Archives. The Index entry carries a 1750
date but Mead's petition was presumably filed during the period he served as

VOL. 8 NO. 2

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAWJOURNAL

murder, a potentially capital offense. The jury found, however, that
the shooting had been by "misadventure" and not "willful murder"
because the victim had "been in a thicket of bushes" and Ayres
"supposed he shot at a bear." The court remanded Ayres "to his
Majesty's gaol there to remain till he be discharged by his Majesty's
39
grace and favour.
3. Over the summer of 1749 Jotham Ordione, a substantial
citizen of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, received two alarming
letters demanding that he deposit £500 in a specified place or
else scores of men would destroy all his property down to the last
sixpence worth and "your person also when ever you can be found
in a convenient place. ' 40 On July 23, a Sunday, he complained to
the Governor and Council, which, perhaps fearing a significant
outbreak of violence, launched an investigation. 41 The extortion
money was due on July 25, and on that date Captain John Mitchell
was arrested at the drop-off point. 42 The Governor and Council
called him in for questioning 43 but seemingly concluded that the
matter should be handled in ordinary course by the criminal justice
system. In any event, Mitchell was indicted in August and pleaded
not guilty.44 After a jury trial he was convicted, and fined £ 1,000 plus
the estate's administrator, 1754-56. See 25
39

NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE PAPERS

11-12 (Hammond ed., 1936).
The documentation is to be found in Provincial Case File No. 26947 and
Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. B, Sept. 1750 - Mar. 1754, at 28788, New Hampshire State Archives. See generally Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S.
180, 192 (2009) (noting that clemency power is a deeply-rooted feature of
Anglo-American legal tradition with particular importance in capital cases). Cf
CAROLINE ALEXANDER, THE BOUNTY: THE TRUE STORY OF THE MUTINY

40

206-07, 285-86, 297-98 (2003) (reporting that when defense
counsel heard news of one mutineer's death sentence in 1792 he immediately
and correctly concluded that pardon would be forthcoming and that client's
life was as safe as if he had been acquitted).
The material in this sentence is drawn from the indictment cited infra note 44.

41

See 5 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW

ON THE BOUNTY

HAMPSHIRE 128-29 (1871).
42

See 3 COLLECTIONS, HISTORICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS AND MONTHLY

LITERARY JOURNAL 133-34 (1824)

(giving account of episode in which

Mitchell was innocent passerby, as shown by subsequent confession of
guilty party); Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. B, supra note 39, at 286
(recording guilty plea and sentencing of co-defendant William Blair in 1725).
43

See 5 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW

supra note 41, at 129.
The indictment with Mitchell's plea endorsed is in Provincial Case File No
18130, New Hampshire State Archives.
HAMPSHIRE,

44
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costs of prosecution as well as being ordered to provide sureties. 45
In November the Governor reported to the Council that Mitchell
and a number of his supporters had been seeking clemency. 46 After
quoting the portion of his royal instructions dealing with his power
of "remitting all fines and forfeitures &c.," he sought and received
the Council's approval "to suspend the payment of the fine. 47
48
Mitchell was discharged accordingly.
4. InJuly 1725 George Walton of Portsmouth, New Hampshire
was called before the Council to answer charges brought by Captain
George Walker of "refusing as ferryman to transport troops and
horses from Dover to Newington for his Majesty's service," and
"expressing himself in contumacious and defamatory words in
regard to the government of New Hampshire. '49 After hearing both
parties the Council referred the complaint to a special session of the
50
Justices of the Peace to take place a week later.
In the first three cases the prisoner's continued incarceration
rested with executive officers exercising their roles in a way
complementary to that of the judges, while in the last one those
officers concluded that the entire situation should be dealt with
by judges. 51 In each instance the officeholders (even if the same
individuals) self-consciously observed their assigned role allocations.
45
46
47
48
49

50
51

See Minute Book of Superior Court, Aug. Term 1749, at 2, New Hampshire
State Archives.
See 5 DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF NEW
HAMPSHIRE, supra note 41, at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
See Minute Book of Superior Court, Aug. Term 1749, at 2, New Hampshire
State Archives.
The summons, with the disposition thereof appearing on its reverse, is in the
Executive Council Records, Box 5, Folder - Council Minutes, 1690-1769, New
Hampshire State Archives.
Id.
Another such example comes from the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1698.
In Burroughs v. Copley's Administrator, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND 45, 54 (Carroll T. Bond & Richard B.
Morris, eds. 1933), 77 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND ONLINE, http://aomol.
msa.maryland.gov/000001/000077/html/ (last visited June 20, 2015), the
Court, on which the Governor sat, was divided 3-3. Counsel for the plaintiff
asked whether the Governor would exercise "a swaying vote," but he refused
and the case was put over to be decided the next term by a five-member bench.
This represented a decision that the case "should be disposed of routinely by
the rule of law rather than by some special political calculus or gubernatorial
political judgment." William E. Nelson, The Law of Colonial Maryland: Virginia
Without its Grandeur, 54 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 168, 186 (2014).
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2. The Sovereign
Most critically, the monarch had various roles, whose
boundaries the courts would enforce.5 2 Tracing the development
of this phenomenon through a wilderness of more-or-less reliable
history from Magna Carta through the sixteenth century5 3 and from
there through the better documented period of Edward Coke and
the Petition of Right,5 4 the English Civil War and the execution of6
5
Charles 1,55 the Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of Rights
lies well beyond the scope of this article.5 7 But the power of courts
to hold royal acts unlawful was an accepted part of the English
constitution,5 8 with practical consequences that were quite clear by
the eighteenth century.5 9 For example:
The Crown could not validly make a second grant impairing
the rights of a prior grantholder, whether the subject of the grant

52

See 6 JOHN BAKER, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68-69
(2003); HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 610-11.

53

See, e.g., HENRY CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT'S

INHERITANCE 26 (5th ed. 1721). See also Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Magna
Carta, the Rule of Law, and the Limits on Government, at 8-9 (forthcoming 2016
INT'L REV. L. & ECON.) (on file at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

cfm?abstract id =2676184).
54

See JOHN M. BARRY, ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE CREATION OF THE

67-70
(2012).
See id. at 277-78, 356-57. See generally Eric M. Freedman, TheLaw as King and the

AMERICAN SOUL: CHURCH, STATE AND THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY

55

King as Law: Is a PresidentImmune from CriminalProsecutionBefore Impeachment?, 20
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 7, at 14 n.17 (1992).

56

57

The Bill of Rights Act, 1689 [n.s.], 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.). See generally
HAMBURGER, supranote 31, at 156-59. For general accounts of the period see
JOHN MILLER, JAMES II (2005); J.R. JONES, THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN
ENGLAND (1972); and CRAIG ROSE, ENGLAND IN THE 169oS: REVOLUTION
RELIGION AND WAR (1999).
One sketch appears in DANIEL J. HULSEBOCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE:
NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE

58
59

ATLANTIC WORLD 32-41 (2005).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 202.

For an excellent overview see

REID,

supra note 26.
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was an office, 60 corporate privileges, 61 or land. Thus, for example,
during 1749 the King created New Town, New Hampshire, from
territory previously granted to South Hampton.6 2 When an action
was brought to test this it resulted in a ruling "that the King has not
by law a power to make a second charter with addition of persons and
estates for a town which has one in full force at the time of making
'63
the second so as bind the town thereby without their consent.
The judges could and did rule that certain offices or
prerogatives were beyond royal power to grant at all. Thus, for
example, when in 1558 Queen Mary selected one Robert Coleshill to
be a judicial clerk to Anthony Browne, the Chief Justice of Common
Pleas, the position was contested by Alexander Scroggs who had
been appointed by Browne. The judges of Queens Bench ruled "that
the title of Colsehill was null, and that the gift of the said office by no
'64
means and at no time belongs or can belong to our lady the queen.
Similarly, in 1604 all the judges of England published formal advice
to James I that the monarch lacked power to transfer (for a fee) to
a private individual the royal prerogative of granting dispensations
65
from the obligation of complying with statutes.

60

See Rex v. Savage (KB 1519), reprinted in 2 J.H. BAKER, REPORTS OF CASES

699, 704 (2000) (quoting statement of court "that where
the king, by his letters patent dated the first of May, grants me an office and
something else, and then by other letters patent dated the second of May he
grants the same thing to a stranger, these second letters patent are absolutely
void.").
See HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 194 & n.41. CompareTrustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 560 (1819) (argument of
Daniel Webster that "the king cannot abolish a corporation, or new model
it, or alter its powers, without its assent") with id. at 643 (statement of Chief
Justice Marshall in opinion that Parliament would have had power to annul
the charter but "the perfidy of the transaction would have been universally
acknowledged.").
The documentation is in Provincial Case File 23510, New Hampshire State
Archives.
Bagley v. Elliot, Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. B, Sept. 1750 - Mar.
1754, at 260, New Hampshire State Archives.
Skrogges v. Coleshill (1559), 2 Dyer Rep. 175a, at 175b (Q.B.). To make the
ruling stick the judges had to release Scroggs by habeas corpus from the Fleet
prison, to which he had been committed by a commission appointed by the
Queen to resolve the dispute after she was dissatisfied with the first ruling.
See id.; J.H. Baker, PersonalLiberty Under the Common Law, 1200-1600, in THE
ORIGINS OF MODERN FREEDOM IN THE WEST 178, 199 (R.W. Davis ed.,
1995) (describing case).
See Penal Statutes (1605), 7 Coke Rep. 36b.
BY JOHN CARYLL

61

62
63
64

65
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The judges would restrain the monarch from encroaching on
subjects' ancient liberties. For example, although the Crown could
requisition provisions on condition of paying reasonable prices,66
the Magna Carta barred the taking of standing timber without the
owner's consent.6 7 When the judges pointedly noted this in 1604,
"James I eventually had to publicize that he would comply."6 8
The monarch could neither adjudicate individual cases extrajudicially 9 nor legislate by unilateral proclamation as opposed to Act
of Parliament, 70 nor grant franchises that were contrary to statute or
71
included penal provisions unauthorized by Parliament.
In all of these instances the sovereign could not cause a person
to suffer a legal hardship unless it was one affirmatively permitted
by law. 72 The same principle was at work when the judges granted
relief against unlawful imprisonments, whether by granting the great
writ of habeas corpus, 73 issuing a prerogative writ 74 or imposing
66
67
68
69

70
71

72
73
74

Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V (forbidding taking of private property for public
use without just compensation).
See 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34 (quoting
Magna Carta ch. 21).
HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 196 n.46.
See Prohibitions del Roy, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1342-43 (C.P.) (providing
Coke's account of his reliance on Bracton to inform an enraged James I to
his face that he must rule under God and the Law); Frederick Mark Gedicks,
An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EM O RY L.J. 585, 601-02 (2009);
see also HAMBURGER supra note 31, at 71-73. As correctly observed by Larry
D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 5, 25 (2003), the principle was not that the King could not adjudicate
but rather that he could not do so unilaterally, being required to act judicially
through the House of Lords. See generally Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., Habeas Corpus
Proceedingsin the High Court of Parliamentin the Reign oflames L 1603-1625, 54
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 200, 211-15 (2014) (describing judicial character of
Parliament).
See HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 200-02 (describing the point as settled by
the middle of the seventeenth century).
SeeAttorney General v. Donatt (Ex. 1561), reprintedin I J.H. BAKER, REPORTS
FROM THE LOST NOTEBOOKS OF SIR JAMES DYER 49-50 (1994) (holding
void as "utterly against the law" a royal patent to the town of Southampton
making it sole port of entry for certain wines and authorizing collection of
treble customs duty for any landed elsewhere).
See Freedman I, supra note 2, at 596.
See REID, supra note 26, at 5.
See Freedman I, supra note 2, at 593 (noting that "demands for release
from unlawful imprisonment could be made during the colonial and early
national period by seeking a variety of writs, including certiorari, supersedeas,
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money damages. 75 In considering the powers of a committing court
or a subordinate officer, "the central question the judges sought to
decide was what right the jailer had to impose the restraint rather
' 76
than what right the prisoner had to be free of it."
Ill. Courts in the New Nation: ATempestuous Beginning
A. Populist Storms Batter Legal Structures
In the first half century after Independence the legal systems
of the states and the national government developed in ways
particular to their own local political, intellectual, and economic
environments. 77 Events in each jurisdiction moved in ways that were

75

76

77

prohibition, trespass, and replevin - or even by pleadings that asked for no
particular writ at all."); see also Wilkes, supra note 69, at 231. See generally Kevin
Costello, The Writ of Certiorariand Review of Summary Criminal Convictions, 16601848, 128 L.Q. REV. 443 (2012). As Professor Halliday has shown, unifying
the judges' use of the various prerogative writs was a sweeping conception
that it was their role to insure that justice was being done to the prisoners.
See HALLIDAY, supra note 30, at 77-83.
See Baker, supra note 64, at 192-94 (describing how civil damages actions
were routine remedy for unlawful imprisonments well before rise of habeas
corpus); Freedman II, supra note 3, Part II.B.1. See also William E. Nelson, The
Legal Restraint of Power in Pre-RevolutionaryAmerica: Massachusettsas a Case Study,
1760-1775, 18 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1, 8-9 (1974) (listing numerous cases in
Massachusetts seeking damages for official misconduct).
Eric M. Freedman, Liberating Habeas Corpus, 39 REVS. AM. HIST. 395, 396
(2011) (reviewing HALLIDAY, supra note 30). See Freedman I, supra note 2,
at 601, 604, 614, 614 nn.114 & 116 (providing examples from 1629, 1732,
1749, 1772 and 1814 of courts in England and America releasing petitioners
because custodians' returns failed to demonstrate entitlement to detain);
Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 Wis. L. REV. 1165 (providing
extensive post-Independence documentation); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New
HabeasRevisionism, 124 HARV. L. REv. 941, 948 (2011) (describing issue before
English habeas judges as "whether the jailer had a legal basis for confining the
prisoner").
See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THEJEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 7 (1971). See generally Kathryn Preyer, Penal
Measures in the American Colonies, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 326, 326-27 (1982)
(emphasizing that because of geographical and temporal variations, "The
character of each colony at its earlier and later stages needs to be considered
in order to assess the process of change through time").
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"complex, halting, and at times irrational ' 7s rather than linear, 79 and
there remains ample room for future scholarship to illuminate the
details of the timing and contents of specific struggles to create legal
structures that could gain general acceptance.
For present purposes, though, it is sufficient to note that
widespread gales were sweeping the landscape of public opinion in
large parts of the country:
1. Judges were in bad odor. From Royal apparatchiks s0 they
became State officials lacking a popular mandate. Moreover, they were
not thought to add any valuable expertise to government. Whether
or not they were lawyers (and many were not), s ' the general view
was that they knew no more about law - and certainly less about
justice - than a cross-section of the local community: "The authority
of juries to determine the law in civil and criminal cases rested on
the widespread understanding that ordinary citizens had as great an
ability as judges to discern what the law was. ' s2 This view, in turn,
rested critically on the belief that legal constraints on individuals'
behavior should be ones "arising out of and reflecting the community"
rather than ones "elaborated by legally trained professionals. ' s3 In
this vison, "Justice would be personal and pragmatic," reflecting the

78

ELLIS, supra note 77, at viii.

79

See SHUGERMAN, supra note 9, at 31-34 (noting that the "story of early
American courts was not a steady march toward judicial supremacy" but was
characterized by bursts of judicial assertiveness in particular places followed
by political pushback with "judges often... taking two steps forward and one
step back").
See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 400-01 (2009); Gordon S. Wood, The Originsoffudicial
Review Revisited, or How the Marshall Court Made More Out of Less, 56 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 787, 789-90 (1999) (observing that at Independence judges were
considered dangerous, being regarded "essentially as appendages or extensions
of royal authority"); see also HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 341-42. Even
when imposing constraints on the Crown, the judges were, by a fiction more
or less strained, deemed to be implementing the royal will. See BRENDAN

80

MCCONVILLE, THE KING'S THREE FACES: THE RISE AND FALL OF ROYAL

at 8 (2006).
See G. Alan Tarr, ContestingJudicialPower in the States, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 643, 657 (2012).
Id. See Jon P McClanahan, The "True"Right to TrialbyJury: The Founders'Formulation
and its Demise, 111 W.VA. L. REV. 791, 809 (2009).
Id.
AMERICA, 1688-1776,

81
82
83
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idea "that laws were made by people and should reflect the value
system of their creators.

8 4

2. In consequence,
The mass of the people in rural or frontier regions
cherished around 1800 an ingrained hostility to the law
as a profession .... It was not that the American people
were positively resolved on becoming lawless, in the
manner of cinema badmen, but they did profoundly
believe that the mystery of the law was a gigantic
5
conspiracyofthelearnedagainsttheirhelpless integrity.1
3. 'Almost as soon as the lawyers of the young Republic began
to mobilize the forces of the Head against the anarchic impulses of
the American heart they found themselves further embarrassed by a
hostility.., to any and every use of the English Common Law."86 To
the "patriotic hatred of everything British""s were added the attacks
that common law doctrines (a) lacked any sort of American democratic
legitimacy,8 8 and (b) were retrogressive in substance - or at best "a
haphazard accumulation of precedents, quirks [and] obscurities."8 9
Moreover, because the rules emerged from multifarious judicial
pronouncements rather than an easily accessible statute they were
liable to infinite manipulation.9 0
The confluence of the foregoing views, sometimes labelled
"popular legalism" or "popular constitutionalism" led to powerful
forces favoring legal systems that minimized the role of lawyers,

84
85

See Lars C. Golumbic, Who Shall Dictate the Law?: Political Wrangling between
"Whig"Lawyers andBackcountryFarmers in RevolutionaryEraNorth Carolina,73 N.C.
HIST. REV. 56, 64-65 (1996).
PERRY MILLER,

THE LIFE OF THE

MIND

IN AMERICA FROM

THE

102 (1965); see also Golumbic, supra note
84, at 65 (observing that from farmers' viewpoint, "[1] awyers were selling the
law, just as farmers sold their hogs and corn," with the purpose of ensuring
"backcountry dependence on the bar").
MILLER, supra note 85, at 105.
Id.
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR

86
87
88

See

KUNAL M. PARKER, COMMON

LAW,

HISTORY, AND DEMOCRACY IN

AMERICA, 179o-19oo: LEGALTHOUGHT BEFORE MODERNISM

89

MILLER, supra note

85, at 121.

90

See WOOD, supra note 80, at 403-04.

76-77 (2011).
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promoted informal and case-specific dispute resolution, 91 and made
the sources of legal obligation as accessible as possible to ordinary
people. 92 In the words of Thomas Paine:
The courts of law ... hobble along by the stilts and
crutches of English and antiquated precedents. Their
pleadings are made up of cases and reports from English
law books; many of which are tyrannical, and all of
them now foreign to us .... The terms used in courts
of law, in sheriffs' sales, and on several other occasions,
in writs, and other legal proceedings, require reform.
Many of those terms are Latin, and others French ....
[T]hey serve to mystify, by not being generally
understood, and therefore they serve the purpose of
what is called law, whose business is to perplex; and
... from thence to create the false belief that law is
a learned science, and lawyers are learned men ....

91

See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGITIMATING THE LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUDICIAL COMPETENCY IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE

92

31 (2012)

(describing "commonsense jurisprudence": "Spur-of-the-moment judgments,
decreeing neighborly, commonsense solutions to a dispute.., were not only
preferred, they were expected to be superior to the conclusions of a lawyer
needing hours to find an answer in some musty precedent or inscrutable
treatise"); John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566 (1993) (describing people holding these views
as "hostile to lawyers and legal doctrine. They viewed the legal system as
serving an essentially arbitral function: Ordinary people, applying common
sense notions of right and wrong, could resolve the disputes of life in localized
and informal ways."). See also Thomas Paine, To the Citizens of Pennsylvaniaon
the Proposalfor calling a Convention (Aug.1805), reprinted in 4 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS PAINE, App. G, at 457, 459 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1894),
http://oll .libertyfund.org/titles/paine-the-writings-of-thomas-paine-voliv-1791-1804:
Every case ought to be determined on its own merits, without the
farce of what are called precedents, or reports of cases; because,
in the first place, it often happens that the decision upon the
case brought as a precedent is bad, and ought to be shunned
instead of imitated; and, in the second place, because there
are no two cases perfectly alike in all their circumstances, and
therefore the one cannot become a rule of decision for the other.
See Saul Cornell, Idiocy, Illiteracy,and the ForgottenVoices of PopularConstitutionalism:
Ratification and the Ideology of Originalism, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 365, 366 & 366
n.3 (2012); Steven Wilf, The First RepublicanRevival: Virtue, Judging and Rhetoric
in the Early Republic, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1675, 1687 (2000).
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Two farmers or two merchants will settle cases by
arbitration which lawyers cannot settle by law. Where
then is the learning of the law, or what is it good for?
It is here necessary to distinguish between lawyer's law,
and legislative law. Legislative law is the law of the land,
enacted by our own legislators, chosen by the people
for that purpose. Lawyer's law is a mass of opinions and
decisions, many of them contradictory to each other,
which courts and lawyers have instituted themselves,
and is chiefly made up of law-reports of cases taken
from English law books. The case of every man ought
to be tried by the laws of his own country, which he
knows, and not by opinions and authorities from other
countries, of which he may know nothing. A lawyer,
in pleading, will talk several hours about law, but it
93
is lawyer's law, and not legislative law, that he means.
Views like these prevailed in many places, setting their
judicial systems down paths very different from the ones that were
eventually followed. 94 On the national level, these views were
frequently associated with Thomas Jefferson and his Republicans as
95
they attacked their Federalist rivals.
B. The Storm Surge: Legislative Limitations onjudicialAutonomy

93

Paine, supra note 91, at 463-64. Several similar Pennsylvania pamphlets of the
period are cited in PARKER, supra note 88, at 99. For an extensive discussion
of the surrounding history see ELLIS, supra note 77, at 157-83 and Elizabeth
K. Henderson, The Attack on the Judiciaryin Pennsylvania 1800-1810, 61 PA. MAG.
HIST. & BIOG. 113 (1937).

94
95

See infra Parts 111.13, IV.
See MILLER, supra note 85, at 105-06. For a lengthy attack by Jefferson on
the view that the federal courts had inherent common law powers see Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-17-02-0417 ("Of all the doctrines
which have ever been broached by the federal government, the novel one of
the common law being in force & cognisable as an existing law in their courts,
is to me the most formidable. all their other assumptions of un-given powers
have been in the details ... in comparison of the audacious, barefaced and
sweeping pretension to a system of law for the US. without the adoption
of their legislature and so infinitely beyond their power to adopt."). See also
WOOD, supra note 80, at 416-18; infra text accompanying notes 183-86.
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1. Architectural Arrangements
Working within the framework of the ideas described in the
previous section, legislatures in the early nation period often sought
to create judicial systems that would maximize the power of lay
people by (a) staffing the bench with judges who were not lawyers, 96
(b) allocating as much power as possible to juries rather than
judges, 97 and (c) organizing the judiciary in such a way as to avoid

96
97

See REID supra note 91, at 20-37.
See John Reid, From Common Sense to Common Law to CharlesDoe: The Evolution of
Pleadingin New Hampshire, N.H. B.J., Apr. 1959, at 27, 28-30. In the immediate
aftermath of the Revolution the legislatures of North Carolina and Virginia
were only willing to grant equity jurisdiction to the courts on condition that
issues of fact be tried by a jury. See Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson andJuries: The
Problem ofLaw, Reason, and Politicsin the New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35,
82-84 (2005); Golumbic, supra note 84, at 68-69. New Hampshire was even
more grudging. See REID, supra note 91, at 68-69.
Before admiralty litigation was made exclusively federal by Section 9 of
the First Judiciary Act, see Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (providing
for non-jury trials); Kenneth G. Engerrand, Admiralty Jury Trials Reconsidered,
72 Loy. MAR. L.J. 73, 74-75 (2013), juries sat in state court admiralty cases
in Pennsylvania, see, e.g., Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 160 (1792)
(publishing case decided in Supreme Court of Pennsylvania), Virginia, see
Blinka, supra , at 78-81, and New Hampshire, see, e.g., Freeborn v. Howell
(March 1782), Judgment Book of the Rockingham Superior Court, Vol. I, Mar.
1782 - Apr. 1785, at 6-7, New Hampshire State Archives; Atwood v. Jones
(March 1781), Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. H, Feb. 1817 - Sept.
1819, at 474-76, New Hampshire State Archives; Deane v. Parker (Sept. 1779),
id. at 393-95; Doane v. Penhallow (Sept. 1778), id. at 341-43; see also Penhallow
v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795) (detailing procedural history). See
generally Charles W. Wolfram, The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment,
57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 655 n.51 (1973).
This is not surprising. During the colonial period the absence of juries in
admiralty had often led litigants to take steps - including obtaining writs of
habeas corpus - to avoid it. See 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW
IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MIDDLE COLONIES AND THE CAROLINAS,

1660-1730, at 94-96 (2013); Freedman I, supra note 2, at 606 n.77; William E.
Nelson, The Persistenceof PuritanLaw: Massachusetts, 1160-1760, 49 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 307, 350-53 (2013). As the Revolutionary crisis intensified the Sugar
Act of 1764 and the Stamp Act of 1765 expanded admiralty jurisdiction in
ways designed to assist royal revenue collection, and "the admiralty grievance"
emerged as a major issue. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS

177-83 (1986);

CARL UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

207-11 (1960).
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creating superior appellate courts with law-pronouncing powers. 98
They also imposed legislative prohibitions on the citation99 and
official publication'0 0 of judicial decisions in order to prevent their
becoming an authoritative source of law.
2. Wiping Out Courts Wholesale

Once the Revolution broke out, Congress resolved that prize disputes
should be adjudicated in the first instance by state courts, using juries, and

then appealed to a Congressional committee. See HENRY

J. BOURGUIGNON,

THE FIRST FEDERAL COURT: THE FEDERAL APPELLATE PRIZE COURT

OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787,

98

99

at 45-47 (1977); see also infra

note 229 (describing later history). As Professor Bourguignon notes, trial by
jury was "an unheard of innovation for prize courts, obviously inspired by the
decade of complaints against the lack of jury trials in vice-admiralty courts,"
id. at 46. The state courts' practices varied with time and place, and there is
still a good deal of historical work remaining to be done. See id. at 192-96.
See REID, supra note 91, at 116-17; Bond Almand, The Supreme Court of Georgia:
An Account of its Delayed Birth, 6 GA. BJ. 95, 95-98, 106-07 (1944); Walter F.
Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for JudicialIndependence in Antebellum North Carolina: The
Story of Two Judges, 4 LAw & HIST. REV. 129, 130-31 (1986).
See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL
DEPENDENCE IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE
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8 (2009) ("One of

the most direct and frequently implemented ways that legislatures supervised
judges in the era of the early republic was to control what they could read in
court and what they could cite or quote as authority.").
As indicated supra text accompanying note 90, the official publication of judicial
opinions (as distinct from statutes) could be an extremely controversial
political issue in the early Republic because it implicated the lawmaking
authority not just of judges, as opposed to juries, but also of judges as opposed
to legislatures.
The New Hampshire history of this issue has been extensively documented
by John Phillip Reid. See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW:
LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 25-29, 157-79
(2004); id. at 179 (noting that in December 1816 when the governor "signed
into law An act to repeal an act entitled "An act to provide for publishing
reports of the supreme judicial court"' . .. [m]ost political observers in the
state concluded that the struggle over who should control the law ... had
ended" and that "jurors would remain judges of law as well as fact"); REID,
supra note 99, at 8-9 (observing that one reason legislators opposed case
publication was that it "made judges' pronouncements and decisions a source
of law equal to-possibly more persuasive and usually more comprehensive
than-ordinary legislation enacted by elected representatives"); REID, supra
note 91, at 206-11 (tracing subsequent New Hampshire history of issue).
See generally Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise offudicial
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1116 n.353 (2010)
(reporting limited case publication in other states).
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When judicial decisions displeased legislatures, they might
react by abolishing entire courts, thereby terminating the functioning
of judges who otherwise held office during good behavior. 1 1 This
03
10 2
happened in New Hampshire repeatedly, and also in Maryland,

101

Judges in the colonies, unlike those in England following the Glorious
Revolution, had served at the pleasure of the monarch, not during good behavior.
See JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS

76 (2005). This was a longstanding colonial
grievance in America, see, e.g., A.G. ROEBER, FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND
OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LIBERTY

REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL CULTURE, 168o-

181o, at 63 (discussing Virginia complaint on the subject in 1700), which
assumed greater importance as the Revolution neared, see Reid, supra note
97, at 176,192-93, and was articulated in the Declaration of Independence
("He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries."). Post-Independence
constitutions rectified the situation. See U.S. CONST., art. III, §1 ("The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(Noting general public approval of good behavior tenure throughout the States
as embodied in their constitutions and praising it as "certainly one of the most
valuable ... improvements in the practice of government," an excellent barrier
to despotism in monarchies and "in a republic ... a no less excellent barrier
to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body," as well as
"the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); see also James E. Pfander,
Judicial Compensation and the Definition of JudicialPower in the Early Republic, 107
MICH. L. REv. 1 (2008) (noting importance of compensation, as well as tenure,
provision).
102 See REID, supra note 91, at 6 ("New Hampshire's executive and legislature
employed the tactic of legislating judges out of office at least five times to
clear the high court of every member."); see also Freedman II, supra note 3, at
19 n.58 (collecting sources on one of these episodes); Chuck Douglas, Put a
Republican on the Court, GovernorLynch, CONCORD MONITOR, Dec. 7, 2008, at
D I (summarizing history through 1876).
103 See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury andJudicialDeference: The Shadow of
Whittington v. Polk and the MarylandJudiciaryBattle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58,
71-72 (2002). One of the displaced judges, William Whittington (represented
by Robert Goodloe Harper, a prominent federalist lawyer who would later
represent Brick Bollman, see infra note 151) brought suit to reclaim his office.
In an opinion that Professor Shugerman rightly sees as closely connected to
Marbury, see SHUGERMAN, supra note 9, at 36, the Maryland General Court

denounced the repeal legislation in harsh language but went on to hold against
the plaintiff, see Whittington v. Polk, 1 H.&J. 236 (Md. 1802).
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Kentucky 10 4 and South Carolina. 10 5 Very significantly for present
purposes the method was also used on the federal level when the
Judiciary Act of 1802106 repealed the Judiciary Act of 180 1,107 and
the Supreme Court effectively upheld the action' 018 six days after
deciding Marbury v. Madison.10 9

104

105

106

107
108

See 1824 Ky. Acts 44. This statute was repealed by 1826-1827 Ky. Acts 13 ('An
Act To Remove the Unconstitutional Obstructions Which Have Been Thrown
in the Way of the Court of Appeals"). For a full discussion of the surrounding
controversy see Theodore W. Ruger, 'A Question Which Convulses a Nation": The
Early Republic's GreatestDebateAbout the JudicialReview Power, 117 HARV. L. REV.
826 (2004). See also William E. Bivin, The HistoricalDevelopment of the Kentucky
Courts, 47 KY. L.J. 465, 478-79 (1959).
See 1835 S.C. Acts 11. For a description of the political context see James
L. Underwood, JudicialReview in a Legislative State, 37 S.C. L. REV. 335, 34849 (1986) (noting that although the South Carolina Court of Appeals was
abolished the "offending judges were reassigned to other courts"). A similar
set of events took place in Virginia beginning in 1788, see W. Hamilton Bryson,
JudicialIndependence in Virginia, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 707 (2004) (describing
eventual outcome as "an amicable compromise"); Margaret V. Nelson, The Cases
of the Judges:Fact or Fiction, 31 VA. L. REV. 243 (1944); William Michael Treanor,
JudicialReview Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 513-17 (2005).
Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. See Richard H. Fallon, The Many and Varied
Roles of History in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753,
1768 (2015) (noting that statute "divested sixteen recently nominated and
confirmed federal judges of their judgeships"); Michael J. Gerhardt & Michael
Ashley Stein, The Politics of EarlyJustice, FederalJudicialSelection 1789-1861, 100
IOWA L. REV. 551, 569-73 (2015).
Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89.
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803); see also Gerhardt & Stein,
supra note 106, at 573-74 (noting political weakness of efforts by ousted judges
to challenge repeal prior to Supreme Court ruling). In terms of the power of
the judiciary vis. a vis. the legislative branch, Stuart, not Marbury, was "the
main event." SHUGERRMAN, supra note 9, at 46. See WILLIAM E. NELSON,
MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

109

69 (2000) (observing that fundamental distinction between cases was that
if Court had invalidated the Judiciary Act of 1802 in Stuart it "would have
embroiled itself in a political contest with Congress and the president that it
might not have survived").
See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Among the many discussions of the sequence
of events recounted in this sentence of text are Alison L. LaCroix, The New
Wheel in the FederalMachine: From Sovereignty to Jurisdictionin the Early Republic,
2007 Sup. CT REV. 345; Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The
Independence of theJudicialBranch in the New Republic, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 3 1,
77-86 (1998); and Jed Glickstein, Note, After Midnight: The CircuitJudges and the
Repeal of the JudiciaryActof 1801,24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 543 (2012).
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3. Pressuring Individual Judges
A legislature might also put pressure on individual judges by
impeachment - as happened dramatically to Justice Chase 10 and
others"' - by calling them before it to explain their conduct" 2 or, in
some states, by voting an "address," i.e., removing judges by simple
legislative vote without any imputation of misconduct. 1 3 Indeed,
a frustrated President Jefferson, lamenting that it would take two
years to try the Chase impeachment, commented to Senator Plumer
of New Hampshire, "The Constitution ought to be altered, so that
the President should be authorized to remove a Judge from office, on

110

See WILLIAM

H. REHNQUIST,

GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC

IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW

JOHNSON 1-134 (1992);JANE SHAFFER ELSMERE,JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE

111

157-310 (1980); David P. Currie, The Constitutionin Congress: The Most Endangered
Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219, 249-59 (1998) (describing
proceedings); see also Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the FederalJudiciary:
The Chase Impeachment and the Constitution, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 55 (1995).
See generally ELLIS, supra note 77, at 102 (attributing Chase's acquittal in part
to fact that "Marshall had initiated a period of judicial self-restraint" after
1800).
On the federal level, the Chase impeachment was preceded by that of United
States District Judge John Pickering. There is a colorful and insightful account
in REID, supra note 99, at 90-109; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 110, at
127-28; LYNN WARREN TURNER, THE NINTH STATE: NEW HAMPSHIRE'S

FORMATIVE YEARS 211-14 (1983). An important state-level counterpart in
the same time period was the impeachment and conviction ofJudge Alexander
Addison of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, see ELSME RE,supra note
110, at 150-52, which was a closely-watched political event, see RHENQUIST,
supra note 110, at 128. See generally Karen Orren & Christopher Walker, Cold
Case File: Indictable Acts and Officer Accountability in Marbury v. Madison, 107
AM. POLL. ScI. REV. 241, 250 (2013); Jeremiah Smith, John Marshall, in
BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, PROCEEDINGS
...

HELD AT MANCHESTER, N.H., FEBRUARY 4 1901, at 287, 292

(1901)

(describing episodes in Rhode Island and Ohio).
112

See HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 8, at 65-66 & 390 n.59.

113

See REID, supra note 99, at 59-60. Professor Reid describes the power of address
as the "most excruciating hold that the legislators had over the judges as
individuals" in New Hampshire and explains how it was used there to reinforce
the weapon of court abolition. RE ID, supra note 91, at 203. See also Dean C.B.
Seymour, The Recall from the Standpoint of Kentucky Legal History, 21 YALE L.J.
372, 372-73, 381-82 (1912) (noting that each Kentucky constitution since
statehood had contained this device and arguing in favor of it).
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the address of the two Houses of Congress." 114

Furthermore, in a number of states the legislatures elected
the judges for a prescribed period, sometimes as short as a year,
which meant that if the legislature did not like their decisions it
115
could simply replace them with more pleasing incumbents.
4. Re-deciding Cases
Legislatures might also interfere with judicial decisionmaking on a retail rather than wholesale basis by reviewing the factual
and legal determinations of courts and, if so disposed, reversing
them." 6 Indeed, John Marshall wrote to Samuel Chase just before
the latter's impeachment trial that a more appropriate mechanism
for dealing with "legal opinions deemed unsound by the legislature"
than impeachment was the vesting of "appellate jurisdiction in the
1 7
legislature."
It has long been known that legislatures exercised such power
in Connecticut" 8 and Rhode Island" 19 but the practice was not limited
to those states. 20 The New Hampshire legislature engaged in it

114

115
116
117
118

119
120

See Letter from William Plumer to T.W. Thompson (Feb. 18 1803), reprintedin
WILLIAM PLUMER, JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER253 (1857); see also ELLIS,
supra note 77, at 104 (attributing Chase's acquittal in part to fact that Jefferson
did not want to see him removed from office by impeachment); WOOD, supra
note 80, at 422-25.
See Wood, supra note 80, at 401-02 (identifying Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Vermont as states with annual legislative election of judges).
See, e.g., 1814 N.C. Sess. Laws 5 (requiring legislative ratification of any judicial
judgment of divorce), repealed by 1818 N.C. Sess. Laws 21.
Letter from John Marshall to Samuel Chase (Jan. 23, 1805), reprintedin 6 THE
PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 347-48 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1990).
See Calder v. Bull U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (rejecting federal constitutional
challenge); SWIFT, infra note 207 (criticizing Connecticut practice). For a
recent evaluation of Calder, see Evan C. Zoldan, Is Calder Bull? How Exposing a
HistoricalBlunderResolves a Modern ConstitutionalDebate, 2015 WIs. L. REV. 727
(2015).
See Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856) (invalidating practice).
But cf.Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separationof
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1730 (2012) (asserting that " [o]utside Connecticut
and Rhode Island, which ... preserved the power of legislative adjudication
until ...1818 and 1848, respectively, the only major adjudicatory powers that
state and federal legislatures continued to enjoy" after Independence were "the
power to impeach government officials and the power to satisfy private claims
on public debt").
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frequently, 121 and similar evidence is emerging from Massachusetts.

122

Thomas Jefferson complained in 1788 that since Independence the
Virginia legislature had "in many instances, decided rights which
123
should have been left to judiciary [sic] controversy."'
There is, moreover, every reason to believe that examples
from other states remain to be unearthed by historians. 124 For
instance, in 1824, the Kentucky legislature passed 'AnAct for the
Benefit of Benjamin Craig and Others.'

125

This first recited that

"it is represented to the present General Assembly, that there is a
prosecution now depending in... Boone County against Ben. Craig
for stabbing, and because the person with whom the said Craig had
the conflict, possesses numerous and influential relations in said
county.., the said Craig believes.., that a fair trial cannot be had in
said country," and then enacted that "a change of venue be granted
1
and allowed the said Craig, to the county of Scott."'

121
122

26

Numerous examples are documented in REID, supra note 99, at 62-70 and
Freedman 1I,supra note 3, at 68-70.
See HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 526-29. See also WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY,

176o-1830, at 14 (1994 ed.) (noting

same practice in colonial Massachusetts).

123
124

125
126

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

127 (1788),

quoted in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1331 (2016) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., 1821 N.C. Sess. Laws 66 ('An Act for the Relief of Charlotte McDonald")
(terminating proceedings against McDonald, who was then under indictment
for bigamy).
1824 Ky. Acts 56.
Id. Subsequent sections of the statute similarly granted James K. Laird and
Gilbert Christian, indicted for murder in Henderson County a change of venue
to Hopkins County, id. at 58, and William Frogg, indicted in Cumberland
County "for maliciously stabbing a man by the name of Rupe," a change of
venue to Wayne County, id. at 59. When Kentucky adopted a new constitution
in 1850, it added art. II, 5 38: "The General Assembly shall not change the
venue in any criminal or penal prosecution, but shall provide for the same by
general laws." The provision currently in force, Section 11 of the Kentucky
Constitution of 1891, provides that "the General Assembly may provide by a
general law for a change of venue in such prosecutions for both the defendant
and the Commonwealth, the change to be made to the most convenient county
in which a fair trial can be obtained."
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C. Ex Parte Bollman and the Precatory Suspension Clause 127
Ex ParteBollman 128 was delivered when judicial independence
was at its nadir 29 and ChiefJustice Marshall was quite understandably
deeply concerned for its future. 30 But his legal reasoning was wrong
then; 1 3 1 the surrounding context changed subsequently; 132 and the

policy implications of Bollman were disturbing. 33 The case is an
artifact of a time that has passed and, as described in Part V below,
has now been properly repudiated by the Supreme Court.
1. The Political and Legal Background
As relevant here, the historic victory of Thomas Jefferson and
his Republicans in the Presidential election of 1800 resulted in:
- The elevation of Secretary of State John Marshall to the Chief
Justiceship, and to the titular leadership of the judicial branch, now
the Federalists' last, and beleaguered, bastion; 34 and
- Connectedly, the ruling in Marbury v. Madison,135 in which
Marshall read Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as conferring
authority on the Supreme Court to exercise original mandamus
powers, and then held the section unconstitutional because it

127

128
129
130

131
132
133
134

135

The narrative below is substantially drawn from Chapter 3 of FREEDMAN, supra
note 11. An earlier version containing additional documentation appeared as
Eric M. Freedman, Just BecauseJohn Marshall Said it, Doesn't Make it So: Ex Parte
Bollman and the Illusory Prohibitionon the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpusfor State
Prisonersin the JudiciaryAct of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000). For a more
recent scholarly account that focuses on the issues of relevance to this article,
see Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 683-98.
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
See supra Part 111.13 & infra text accompanying notes 183-86.
Indeed, even the watered-down opinion he wrote drew political backlash. See
NEWMYER, supra note 12, at 65 ("Loyal [Jefferson] supporters in Congress,
with Jefferson's encouragement ... renewed their effort to limit the Court's
habeas corpus jurisdiction. Talk of Marshall's impeachment, already rampant
after Marbury, now intensified.").
See infra text accompanying notes 187-96.
See infra Part IV.A.
See Freedman, supra note 18, at 19 (describing doctrinal situation as "potentially
dangerous to constitutional liberty").
See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's
ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 932-33 (1978); supra text

accompanying notes 107-14.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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expanded the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court beyond the
limits laid down in Article III of the Constitution. 136 In his famous
opinion Marshall lambasted his successor, James Madison, for not
delivering to the Federalist William Marbury the commission for the
office of Justice of the Peace to which the Adams Administration had
appointed him in its last hours (and that Secretary of State Marshall
had probably lost himself in the confusion), while not issuing an
order that the Jefferson Administration would surely have ignored.
As matters eventually turned out the Bollman opinion is the
mirror image of the Marbury opinion. In Marbury, Marshall wrote a
decision spiked with harsh dictum, but did not order the Jefferson
administration to deliver Marbury's commission. In Bollman, Marshall
ordered the Jefferson administration to release the prisoners, but
wrote a decision softened with placatory dictum.
2. The Factual Background
When the Jefferson Administration completed its first term in
office, Vice President Aaron Burr (whose poisoned relationship with
Jefferson had led to his being brusquely removed from the secondterm ticket, and who was facing charges in New York and New Jersey
for murder as a result of having killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel),
found it prudent to travel west. 137 There, he allegedly conspired with
others to separate some of this country's newly acquired western
territories from their allegiance to the United States. 38 Among his
alleged co-conspirators were Samuel Swartwout and Dr. Erick Bollman.
In December 1806, they were seized by General James Wilkinson, the
American Army commander in New Orleans (who had himself been
involved in Burr's plans),' 39 and summarily transported by warship
136
137

138

See generally Akhil Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the OriginalJurisdictionof the
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 443 (1989).
See Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is a PresidentImmune
from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 7, 22 &
n.47 (1992).
See REHNQUIST, supra note 110, at 115-16; ARNOLD A. ROGO, A FATAL
FRIENDSHIP: ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND AARON BURR 277-82 (1998).
In due course Burr was tried on these charges in a highly-publicized trial in a
Richmond federal court over which Justice Marshall presided. There are full
accounts in PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE TREASON TRIALS OF AARON
BURR

139

See 2

(2008) and

NEWMYER,

supra note 12.

HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE

ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 241-42

(1891);

HOFFER,

supra
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280

to Baltimore via Charleston - in defiance of writs of habeas corpus
4
140
granted by federal judges in New Orleans and Charleston.1 '
The day the prisoners arrived in Washington, President
Jefferson met with Bollman to discuss a plea bargain, 42 and one of
the President's leading Senate allies - seeking to insure that Bollman
and Swartwout would not obtain any further pesky writs of habeas
corpus - introduced legislation to suspend the writ for three months
and to keep the two imprisoned. 43 Convening in closed session, the
Senate passed the measure with only a single dissenting vote, but
over a weekend, the atmosphere cooled and the House, by a vote of
44
113-19, bluntly rejected the proposal as unworthy of consideration. 1
On the following day, the United States attorney moved the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia for an arrest warrant
in order to have the pair committed to stand trial on a charge of
146
treason. 45 A politically divided bench granted the motion.
note 138, at 86; NEWMYER, supra note 12, at 47-48.
140

See 1 POLITICAL CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF AARON BURR

982-83 (Mary-Jo Kline &Joanne W. Ryan eds., 1983). Several detailed accounts
appear in the N.Y. Eve. Post, Feb. 18, 1807, at 1, which also reports Henry
Clay's much-publicized comment in the Senate on February 11 "that the late
seizure of men at New Orleans, by military force, and the transportation of
them to the Atlantic coast, was one of the most arbitrary and outrageous acts
ever committed."

141

143

See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 302 (1922).
See HOFFER, supra note 138, at 95; MILTON LOMASK, AARON BURR: THE
CONSPIRACY AND THE YEARS OF EXILE, 18o5-1835, at 202 (1982).
SeeJEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 355

144

(1996). The Congressional proceedings are recounted at greater length in
Amanda Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 901, 981-85 (2012).
See HOFFER, supra note 138, at 88; NEWMYER, supra note 12, at 50-51; AM.

142

145

146

MERCURY, Feb. 12, 1807 (Congress), at 1 (reporting House debate).
See United States v. Bollman, 24 F. Cas. 1189 (C.D.C. 1807) (No. 14,622). In
support of the application, the United States attorney proffered an affidavit
from General Wilkinson "and a printed copy of the president's message to
congress of the 22d of January, 1807." Id. In this communication, Jefferson
denounced the conspiracy and said that General Wilkinson's information
placed Burr's guilt "beyond question." See 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 39, 40
(1807); see also id. at 1008-18 (reprinting supporting documents accompanying
message).
See Bollman, 24 F. Cas. at 1189. The ChiefJudge, William Cranch, a Federalist,
opined that there was insufficient probable cause, but was outvoted by his two
Republican colleagues. See HOFFER, supra note 138, at 95; NEWMYER, supra

note 12, at 50-56. Extended accounts of the proceedings appear in the National
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The prisoners then applied to the United States Supreme Court
for writs of habeas corpus. As Justices Johnson and Chase expressed
doubts as to the Court's jurisdiction, Chief Justice Marshall set that
preliminary question down for a full argument. 147 In a reflection of
the political context, interest in the argument "was at fever pitch,
1
almost the whole of Congress being in attendance.'

48

3. Arguments of Counsel
The Attorney General, who apparently did not doubt the
Court's power to grant the writ, "declined arguing the point on
behalf of the United States."''

49

In fact, he told the bench that if

it should determine "to issue a writ of Habeas Corpus he should
cheerfully submit to it.'

S0

Thus, the Justices heard argument only

from petitioners' counsel, principally from the prominent Federalists
5
Robert Goodloe Harper and Charles Lee.' '
In the portion of his argument of present relevance, Harper
addressed whether "this court has the power generally of issuing
the writ."'1

5

2

In support of an affirmative response Harper urged that

(1) the Court had inherent power to issue writs of habeas corpus

147
148
149
150
151

152

Intelligencer of Feb. 2, 1807 and Feb. 4, 1807. See also WARREN, supranote 141,
at 303-04 (reprinting letter from Cranch to his father describing surrounding
atmosphere).
SeeExParte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 76 n.(a) (1807).
Francis Paschal, The Constitutionand Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE LJ. 605, 625.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 79.
Extract of a Letter to the Departmentof War, N.Y. EVE. POST, Feb. 14, 1807, at 1.
The four lawyers who appeared for the petitioners had constituted Justice
Chase's defense team in his impeachment trial. See HOFFER, supra note 138, at
98-99. Lee, a former Attorney General of the United States, had been William
Marbury's lawyer in his unsuccessful effort to obtain his commission. As
indicated supra note 103, Harper had represented another of the displaced
judges in connected litigation.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 79.
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generally, and (2) was authorized to do so in this case by a statute 15
15 4
that was (a) applicable and (b) constitutionally valid.
(1)
Harper's initial proposition was:

3

The general power of issuing this great remedial
writ [of habeas corpus] is incident to this court as
a supreme court of record. It is a power given to such
a court by the common law . . . . [A court that]
possessed no powers but those given by statute...
could not protect itself from insult and outrage ....
It could not imprison for contempts in its presence. It
could not compel the attendance of a witness . . .
These powers are not given by the constitution, nor
by statute, but flow from the common law ....
[T]he power of issuing writs of habeas corpus, for the
purpose of relieving from illegal imprisonment, is one
of those inherent powers, bestowed by the law upon
every superior court of record, as incidental to its
55
nature, for the protection of the citizen.1

153

154

155

The statute in question was Section 14 of the First Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 5 14,
1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789). With clause numbering inserted for ease of reference,
the section provided:
[1] That all the.., courts of the United States shall have the power
to issue writs of scirefacias,habeas corpus, [2] and all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, [3] which may be necessary for
the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law. [4] And that either of the justices of
the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall
have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment. [5] Provided, That writs of
habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless
where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of
the United States, or are committed for trial before some court
of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
For convenience, I have numbered counsel's arguments, and in the next
section of text used the same numbering to designate Marshall's responses
and my own analysis. Also for convenience, I have relied on the version of
the argument reprinted in the United States Reports. Another version, which
is very similar but perhaps preserves Harper's oratory slightly better, was
published in two parts in the National Intelligencer of Feb. 18, 1807 and Feb.
20, 1807. The surrounding atmosphere is well captured by HOFFER, supra
note 138, at 97-111.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 79-80.
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Harper supported this argument by showing "that all the
superior courts of record in England," whether or not they had any
criminal jurisdiction or statutorily-granted habeas jurisdiction, "are
invested by the common law with this beneficial power, as incident to
their existence.' 1 56 As an example providing "a conclusive authority
in favour of the doctrine for which we contend," he cited a case
that would have been very familiar to his audience as a monument
to English liberty, Bushel's Case, 57 in which the court of common
pleas (which had no statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction) employed
its common law habeas corpus powers to release a juror who had
been imprisoned because - contrary to evidence that the trial judge
considered convincing - he had dared to vote to acquit William Penn
15 8
on a charge of breaching the peace by preaching on a London street.
Harper then asked whether the American people had not "as good a
right as those of England to the aid of a high and responsible court
' 59
for the protection of their persons?'
(2) (a). Turning to his argument that the Court had jurisdiction
under Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, Harper first argued that the
first sentence contained "two distinct provisions," viz., clause [1]
and the remainder of the sentence. 6 0 The authority to issue writs
of habeas corpus, he argued "is positive and absolute; and not
dependent on the consideration whether they might be necessary for
the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts. To render them dependent on
that consideration, would have been to deprive the courts of many of
the most beneficial and important powers which such courts usually
possess."''
In other words, the federal courts had the authority to
issue writs of habeas corpus when appropriate whether or not
there was an underlying action over which they had subject matter
jurisdiction - a point of some importance to the prisoners, since,

156
157
158

Id. at 82. Harper's account was correct. See Freedman 1,supra note 2,at 610 &
n.93; Freedman I,supra note 3,at 4 n.5; and FREEDMAN, supra note 11.
124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (1670).
See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH,
HISTORY

OF THE

COMMON

LAW: THE

159
160
161

DEVELOPMENT

OF ANGLO-

426 (2009); Freedman II, supra note 3,
at 58 n.247; see also Freedman,supra note 127, at 562 n.85.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 80-81. See Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 690-92
(discussing this passage).
For the text of Section 14 with interpolated clause numbers see supra note 153.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 83.
AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
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other than the habeas corpus application itself, there was no action
pending in the Supreme Court.
(2) (b). Harper next addressed the problem posed by Marbury,
namely, that the Section 13 of the Judiciary Act 1 62 - which bore
an uncomfortable resemblance to Section 14 - had been held
unconstitutional as an attempt to confer upon the Court original
jurisdiction in violation of the limitations on that jurisdiction
contained in Article III of the Constitution. 6 3 Harper asserted that
"the object of the habeas corpus now applied for, is to revise and
correct the proceedings of the court below. ' 164 Hence, the proceedings
were appellate, and fell within the class of cases in which Congress
was authorized to confer jurisdiction on the Court. 65 Therefore, the
statute authorizing the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus was
constitutional.
Indeed, Harper argued, the Court had in fact granted relief on
similar facts twice before. In United States v. Hamilton'66 which arose
out of the Whiskey Rebellion, Hamilton, who "had been committed
upon the warrant of the District Judge of Pennsylvania, charging
him with High Treason," brought a habeas corpus petition to the
Supreme Court challenging the sufficiency of the evidence against
him. Rejecting the government's defense that the decision of the
District Judge could be revised only on the "occurrence of new matter"
or a "charge of misconduct," the Court had ordered that Hamilton

162

163

164
165

166

"The Supreme Court shall ... have power to issue.., writs of mandamus, in
cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed,
or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States." First
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 5 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789).
U.S. CONST. art. ILL, 5 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other cases before
mentioned [in U.S. CONST. art. III, 5 2, cl. 1], the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). The ruling in Marbury
was that Section 13 authorized the Court to assume original jurisdiction
over controversies, like the one involved there, that did not fall within the
first sentence just quoted, and was therefore unconstitutional. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-76 (1803).
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 86.
That is, this case fell within the second sentence quoted from Article III supra
note 163.

3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795).
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be admitted to bail. 167 And just the previous year, the Court had
decided Ex Parte Burford.'6 8 There, Burford, confined in the District
of Columbia under a commitment charging that he was "an evil doer
and disturber of the peace," had petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court was "unanimously of opinion,
that the warrant of commitment was illegal, for want of stating some
good cause certain, supported by oath," (original emphasis) it had ordered
the prisoner discharged. 6 9
4. Marshall's Opinion
(1). In the section of greatest significance for present purposes,
Marshall's opinion began by rejecting Harper's argument that all
courts of record have inherent habeas corpus powers and disclaiming
"all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the
United States":
Courts which originate in the common law possess
a jurisdiction which must be regulated by the
common law . . . but courts which are created by
written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by
written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction. It
is unnecessary to state the reasoning on which this
opinion is founded, because it has been repeatedly
given by this court; and with the decisions heretofore
rendered on this point, no member of the bench,

167

Id. at 17-18. See 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
THE UNITED STATES 514-21 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1998).

COURT OF

Dissenting
in Bollman, Justice William Johnson agreed that the "case of Hamilton was
strikingly similar to the present," but argued "that the authority of it was
annihilated by the very able decision in Marburyv. Madison," since the Hamilton
Court had been exercising original jurisdiction. Bollman, 8 U.S. at 103-04
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
168 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
169 Id. at 450-51, 453. Dissenting in Bollman, Justice Johnson reported that he had
objected to the Court's disposition of Burford, but had "submitted in silent
deference to the decision of my brethren." Bollman, 8 U.S. at 107 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). He also reported that his Bollman dissent had the support of an
absent Justice. Id. Scholars have long been hopelessly divided as to whether
this was Chase or Cushing. See

DAVID P.

CURRIE,

THE CONSTITUTION IN

1789-1888, at 81 n.131
(1985); see also NEWMYER, supra note 12, at 57 (picking Chase as most likely).
THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
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has even for an instant, been dissatisfied .... The
inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by
any statute, compatible with the constitution of the
United States, the power to award a writ of habeas
corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and
170
Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court.

(2) (a). Marshall accepted Harper's assertion that clause [1]
of Section 14 is independent of the remainder of the first sentence,
but did so in a way from which the field has only recovered in the
17
past decade.'
(i) He began by quoting the Suspension Clause 72 and
suggesting that, "[a]cting under the immediate influence of this
injunction," the First Congress "must have felt, with peculiar force,
the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the
means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although
no law for its suspension should be enacted.' ' 73 Thus, the statute
should receive a robust reading.
(ii) Marshall next observed that, since the restriction in clause
[3] (i.e. "which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective
jurisdictions") plainly did not apply to the second sentence of Section
14, if it were to be applied to clause [1], the result would be that
individual judges would have more power than courts, which "would
'1 74
be strange.'

170

171
172

173
174

Bollman, 8 U.S. at 93-94. The elided portion of the passage contains two further
responses to Harper's arguments on the role of the common law. First, Marshall
asserted, "for the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may unquestionably
be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts
of the United States, must be given by written law." Second, responding to
Harper's discussion of the contempt power, Marshall wrote, "This opinion is
not to be considered as abridging the power of courts over their own officers, or
to protect themselves, and their members, from being disturbed in the exercise
of their functions. It extends only to the power of taking cognizance of any
question between individuals, or between the government and individuals."
See infra Part V. To assist the reader of this page of text, Section 14 with
interpolated clause numbers has been set forth supra note 153.
U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.").
Bollman, 8 U.S at 95.
Id. at 96.
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(iii) Moreover, Marshall continued, in a lengthy passage, to
apply the limitation in clause [3] to clause [1] would render it largely
meaningless, since, in light of the restrictions on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, there would never be any occasion to issue the
writ if it could only be done in cases in which it is "being merely used
to enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction in causes which it is
enabled to decide finally,' 175 with one exception.
That exception, he wrote - the only power "which on
this limited construction would be granted by the section under
consideration" - would be the power "ofissuing writs of habeas corpus
ad testificandum," that is, ones designed to bring witnesses before the
court. But the "section itself proves that this was not the intention
of the legislature," because that variety of the writ was the subject of
its own special provision, namely the proviso in clause [5] .176
He continued, "This proviso extends to the whole section.
It limits the powers previously granted to the courts . . . .That
construction cannot be a fair one which would make the legislature
except from the operation of a proviso, limiting the express grant of
1' 77
a power, the whole power intended to be granted.'
Therefore, Marshall concluded, Section 14 allowed a federal
court to make "an inquiry into the cause of commitment" by federal
authorities regardless of whether or not there was an underlying
litigation pending before it 1 78 - meaning that the statute covered
the present circumstances.
(2) (b). Having decided that the Court had statutory authority
to issue the writ, Marshall turned to the constitutional issue framed
by Marbury and, accepting Harper's argument, ruled in a few terse
sentences that the jurisdiction "which the court is now asked to
175
176
177
178

Id. at 96-97.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100. The prisoners in Bollman were federal, not state. Nonetheless,
Marshall, in additional dictum not relevant to this article took the opportunity
to construe the statutory provision respecting the issuance of the writ to
state prisoners (clause [5] of Section 14 as reproduced supra note 153) in a
way that, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, was indefensibly restrictive see
FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 30-35, and that in any event would not lead to
the conclusions he sought to draw, see id. at 36-46. Aspects of my argument
have been criticized in Lee Kovarsky, Prisonersand Habeas Privileges Under the
FourteenthAmendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 609, 622-25 (2014) and in a book
review by Steven Semeraro, Reconfirming Habeas History, 27 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 317 (2005). I hope to address these matters in future work.
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exercise is clearly appellate. It is the revision of a decision of an inferior
court, by which a citizen has been committed to gaol [sic] ."179 Thus
the statute granting the Court the power to issue the writ on the facts
before it was constitutional as well as applicable.
Accordingly, in proceedings stretching over five days, the
Supreme Court proceeded to examine the merits. The "clear opinion
of the court," Marshall said, is "that it is unimportant whether the
commitment be regular in point of form, or not; for this court,
having gone into an examination of the evidence upon which the
commitment was grounded, will proceed to do that which the court
below ought to have done."' 18 0 With the prisoners present,' 8 ' the
Court "fully examined and attentively considered," on an item-byitem basis, "the testimony on which they were committed," held it
82
insufficient, and ordered their discharge.
5. Bollman's Sea Mine
Because the actual (and correct) holding of Bollman was that
a valid statute gave the Court jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus in the case at hand, its disclaimer of common law powers was
pure dictum. Marshall's insertion of these pronouncements is, of
course, easy to explain. Ruling in a highly politicized case so soon after
the 1805 attempt to impeach Justice Chase, 8 3 strong considerations
of political prudence suggested that Marshall take every possible
measure to minimize the risk of attacks on the independence of the
federal judiciary. As so often, he "was doing what was politically
smart and institutionally essential,' 18 4 engaging in a "mixture of

179

Bollman, 8 U.S at 101.

180 Id. at 114.
181

182

183
184

See Supreme Court Minute Book (entries of Feb. 16-20, 1807); Letter from
Buckner Thurston to Harry Innes (Feb. 18, 1807), Innes Papers, Manuscript
Reading Room, Library of Congress.
Bollman, 8 U.S. at 125, 128-36. Although this portion of the opinion is not the
focus of the present article, it was of considerable political significance because
it served as a dress rehearsal for Burr's eventual trial, see HOFFER, supra note
138, at 112, and presaged a successful defense there, see NEWMYER, supra note

12, at 5.
See WOOD, supra note 80, at 421-25; supra text accompanying note 110.
R. Kent Newmyer, ChiefJustice Marshall in the Context of His Times, 57 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 841, 844-45 (1999). See also WOOD, supra note 80, at 438-

40 (describing Marshall's "strategy of retrenchment and conciliation and his
genius for compromise while at the same time asserting the authority of the
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political calculation and legal maneuvering,"' 85 in this case "in order
to maintain at least some level of judicial independence to issue the
1 86
writ in the future.'
As background to the argument presented at the end of this
article that the Court has now reclaimed that independence, 87 it
is important to recognize how weak Bollman was on the day it was
188
decided.
Marshall's claim that the Court had "repeatedly" explained
the reasoning behind the proposition that courts created by written
law could only exercise the powers explicitly granted by such laws
was false. 89 "Where this reasoning had been given Marshall was not
able to say, not because he had no time to collect the citations, but
because there were none to collect."' 90
But this claim is the foundation of Marshall's suggestion that
Congress could suspend the writ by doing nothing at all - the mine
floating underneath the surface of the case. According to the Bollman
dicta, the Constitution as it emerged from Philadelphia did not
preserve a pre-existing writ from suspension, but only whatever writ

185

186

187
188
189

Court"); David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1, 91-92 (2015) (describing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) in similar terms).
See JUSTIN J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 39 (2011). I have reviewed this volume at 43 J.
INTERDISC. HIST. 122 (2012).
WERT, supra note 185, at 39. See also Keith E. Whittington, JudicialReview of

Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. LJ. 1257, 1286-87 (2009) (observing that
effect of Marshall's legal reasoning was that Court could continue to adjudicate
habeas cases).
See infra Part V.
I have made this argument at some length in FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at
29-46. I note here only those points of present relevance.
See Milton Cantor, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: Early American Origins and
Development, in FREEDOM AND REFORM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER, 55, 76-77 (Harold M. Hyman & Leonard W. Levy eds.,

1967) ("Marshall's reasoning in Exparte Bollman was strained and evasive," nor
were "the precedents cited [reassuring] -though Marshall was always weak
in this area."). Scholars have frequently noted Marshall's cavalier treatment
of precedent, whether favorable or unfavorable. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch &
Maeva Marcus,John Marshall'sSelective Use ofHistory in Marbury v. Madison, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 301 (showing how Marshall invented non-existent supporting
precedent and ignored relevant negative precedent). For an insightful summary,
see Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall'sJudicialRhetoric, 1996 SuP. CT.
REV. 439.

190

Francis Paschal, The Constitution andHabeasCorpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, at 628.
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Congress might choose to vouchsafe in the future. The Suspension
Clause under this reading is merely precatory: a request to Congress
to enact a statute giving the federal courts habeas corpus powers.
But if Congress failed to do so, "the privilege itself would be lost,
although no law for its suspension should be enacted."' 191
This idea would certainly have come as a shock to all of the
192
participants in the ratification debates over the Suspension Clause,
193
who had vied with each other in lauding the importance of the writ.
Those debaters knew (as did Marshall, of course) that suspension of
the writ in England or its colonies had required an affirmative Act
of Parliament, 194 and that the contours of Parliamentary suspension
authority had been the source of bitter controversy in the context of
the American Revolution. 195
If any substantial body of opinion had shared Marshall's
precatory view of the meaning of the Suspension Clause, the ratifiers
would surely have insisted on preserving the entitlement to the writ
by an amendment in the Bill of Rights. But the ratifiers saw no need
to do this because, since "the writ was not constitutionally granted in
positive terms in many state constitutions, and [was] only recognized
indirectly by a limitation placed upon the authority to suspend its
operations," they naturally assumed "that the non-suspension clause
in the federal document also functioned in oblique fashion, implicitly

191

193

Bollman, 8 U.S at 95. See Freedman, supranote 18, at 19-20 (describing modern
terrorism scenarios that might trigger this hypothetical). Only by interpreting
Marshall's observation to mean the opposite of what it says, as Justice Stevens
did in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304 n.24 (2001), is it possible to assert
that Bollman's dicta did not represent a lurking threat to civil liberties, see, e.g.,
Isaac J. Colunga, Ex Parte Bollman: Revisiting a Federalist's Commitment to Civil
Liberty, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 429, 434 (2006). See generally supra note 17
(collecting sources on St. Cyr).
See DanielJ. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantanamo:The Boumediene
Decision, 2008 S. CT. REV. 1, 11-12 ("[I]t would have astonished the Framers
to think that they had protected the writ against suspension (presumably
by Congress)-but that Congress could achieve the same result, not by
suspending a writ it had otherwise made available, but instead by simply
precluding the federal courts from making it available in the first place.").
See FREEDMAN, supra note 11, at 12-19.

194

See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND

192

RELIEF 61 (1996).

195

For extended discussions see Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 644-51 and
Amanda L. Tyler, HabeasCorpus andthe America Revolution, 103 CAL. L. REV. 635
(2015).
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conferring the right of the privilege"' 196 until such time as a valid
legislative suspension occurred.
IV. Hands to the Pumps
Over the course of time, and again with substantial local
variations, 197 the hydraulic pressure of the ideas outlined in Part III.A
was weakened by a sustained counter-attack whose forces included
legal, intellectual, political, and economic elements. 198 None of these
forces, however, could make room in their ranks for jury autonomy,
which began a steep decline. 99
A. Rebuilding Judicial Autonomy
1. The Resuscitation of Common Law Pronounced by LegallyTrained Judges
The common law as applied by a professional judiciary had
always retained some support 20 0 and important supporters, 20 ' and
196

197
198
199
200

201

Cantor, supra note 189, at 75. See Tyler, supra note 143, at 958-59 (noting that
pattern of states during Revolution was to assume existence of habeas privilege
and suspend it legislatively as seemed warranted).
For sketches of the struggles in a few key states, see WOOD, supra note 80, at
425-32.
See generally McClanahan, supra note 82, at 827; Rowe, supra note 13, at 45556.
See LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supra note 158, at 484-88; infra Part LV.B.
See Jeffrey K. Sawyer, English Law and American Democracy in the Revolutionary
Republic: Maryland, 1776-1822, 108 MD. HIST. MAG. 261, 266-67 (2013)
(noting that after several contested votes framers of Maryland constitution
of 1776 determined to perpetuate "a traditional role for learned lawyers and
judges in guiding the development of the law through the work of the judicial
branch of government").
One of these was Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire who,
regardless of the state of public opinion (which was volatile, see REID, supra
note 100, at 33-55) believed it his duty to write reasoned opinions in the
"quixotic" but ultimately correct belief that they would eventually be published,
whether publicly or privately. See id. at 66. One example of such an opinion

is Kidder v. Smith (N.H. 1807), reprinted in

DECISIONS OF THE SUPERIOR

AND SUPREME COURTS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE .... SELECTED FROM THE

155 (Boston,
Little, Brown, and Company 1879). In this ruling he first (a) determined that
a tax statute might be construed in accordance with "the usage of the State
from the earliest times of which we have any knowledge, i.e. by the common
MANUSCRIPT REPORTS OF THE LATE JEREMIAH SMITH...

Eric M. Freedman
during the first half of the nineteenth century a series of factors
strengthened their influence.
On the intellectual level, the period saw a number of responses
20 2
to the criticisms canvassed above.
Some authors, building on Blackstone, 20 3 pointed out that
statutes would inevitably require interpretation. 20 4 Not only were
jurors unskilled in performing this function, 20 - but even judges would
be left to improvisation unless they had published judicial opinions
to rely upon. 20 6 Made available to the public, these opinions would
enable it to evaluate the work of the judges. 20 7 Legally-educated
law of the State" to contain an unstated exception for ministers, id. at 156,
and then (b) after extended discussion of history and precedent concerning
the extent of the ministerial exemption, concluded that it did not apply to
the plaintiff. After his retirement, see CHARLES H. BELL, THE BENCH AND
BAR OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 68 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1894), and
long before the case was published, Judge Smith taught it to a law student,
remarking "that it was absurd to suppose that we had no common law for what
is always done in the State is good Common Law.") See 2 DECISIONS OF THE
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

202
203

N.

HAMPSHIRE PREVIOUS TO

1816, at

164 (1824) (unpublished manuscript in library of New Hampshire Supreme
Court, described in Freedman 1I,supranote 3, at 60 n.258. He would doubtless
be pleased to know that his successors on the New Hampshire Supreme Court
have cited the case from time to time. See Town of Canaan v. Enfield Vill. Fire
Dist., 70 A. 250, 252 (N.H. 1908); Grafton v. Town of Haverhill, 40 A. 399,
400 (N.H. 1894).
See supra text accompanying notes 81-93. Some of the scholarly sources
describing these responses are cited in Freedman 1I,supra note 3, at 6 n. 11.
See 1 WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

59-62 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765) (observing that interpretative power
must necessarily exist somewhere because "all cases cannot be foreseen or
expressed" when statutes are written).
204 See [JOSEPH HOPKINSON,] CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF
THE COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 50-58 (Philadelphia, William
P. Farrand and Co. 1809); PARKER,supra note 88, at 100-01. See also WOOD,
supra note 80, at 405-07.
205

See

HOPKINSON,

supra note 204, at 61; see also JOHN

THE HON. JEREMIAH SMITH,

H. MORISON, LIFE OF

LL.D. 247 (Boston, Charles C. Little &James

Brown 1845) (quoting Smith).
See HOPKINSON, supra note 204, at 56; REID, supra note 91, at 59-60; THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining that "to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by... precedents"); Steven Wilf,
The First RepublicanRevival: Virtue, Judging, and Rhetoric in the Early Republic, 32
CONN. L. REV. 1675, 1687-88 (2000) (discussing views of Chancellor Kent).
207 See REID, supra note 100, at 165 (noting this argument by New Hampshire
206

and Pennsylvania authors);

ZEPHANIAH

SWIFT, A VINDICATION

OF
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judges were thus much-needed and valuable public servants for the
20 8
dutiful implementation of the legislative will.
THE CALLING OF THE SPECIAL SUPERIOR COURT ... FOR THE TRIAL
OF PETER LUNG.... WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIARY IN

40-41 (Windham [,Ct.],J. Byrne 1816)
(authored by sitting Chief Judge of Connecticut Superior Court) (arguing that
judges of highest court "should assign the reasons of their decisions, which
ought to be published for the information of the public. In this way we have
a security for the faithful discharge of their duty and the correctness of their
decisions ...in their responsibility to public opinion."); Jessica K. Lowe,
Guarding Republican Liberty: St. George Tucker and Judging in Federal Virginia, in
SIGNPOSTS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOUTHERN LEGAL HISTORY 111, 12627 (Sally E.Hadden & Patricia Hagler Minter eds., 2013) (describing Tucker's
corresponding view).
These arguments were well summarized in an anonymous encyclopedia
article published by Justice Joseph Story in 1844:
As all trials, both civil and criminal, are public; and reports are printed,
from time to time, of those which are most interesting either as to
law, or facts; as the opinion of the court is always publicly given, and,
generally, the reasons of that opinion, it is not easy for any court
to trespass upon the known principles of law or the rights of the
parties. In the U. States ...the citizens at large watch with jealousy
the proceedings of the courts of justice. The very great number of
lawyers engaged in profession also furnishes an additional security.
JOSEPH STORY, Courts ofthe U. States, inTHE UNSIGNED ESSAYS OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 55, 68 (2015) (originally published in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA (Francis Lieber ed., Philadelphia, Lea &
Blanchard 1844)).
See MILLER, supra note 85, at 125. When, beginning in 1794, the Supreme
Court of the United States began to evaluate the constitutionality of federal
statutes, it took a similar approach, treating its task as implementing the will
of the People who framed the Constitution. See Whittington, supra note 186,
at 1270-84. See also 2 DAVID RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

208

FROM ITS FIRST SETTLEMENT IN 1670, TO THE YEAR 18o8, at

129 (1809)

(stating that South Carolina judicial system was modeled on England "but
with this difference, the state considered her courts as the courts of the
people in their sovereign capacity, enforcing justice between separate units
of one common mass of sovereignty); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that because
judges are empowered by the people judicial review does not "suppose a
superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the
power of the people is superior to both."); Lowe, supra note 207, at 119-21
(describing same argument being made in Virginia state cases); see generally
WOOD, supra note 80, at 449 (" [T]reating the Constitution as mere law that
had to be... applied to particular cases like a statute suggested that American
judges had a special authority to interpret constitutions that other branches
of the government did not possess.").
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As to the common law, a long list of legal scholars, judges and
eminent practitioners worked to re-frame it by "adding elements of
consent and choice. ' 20 9 The common law was not an anachronistic
bundle of outmoded rules bequeathed by ancient foreigners, but rather
the crowd-sourced and evolving expression of the current consensus
of American society and therefore quite as democratically legitimate
as any statute. 210 In lecture notes prepared in 1836, Jeremiah Smith
described the common law of New England this way:
It is made just as the English common law was made;
a collection of the general customs and usages of
the community; maxims, principles, rules of action,
founded in reason, and found suitable to that first
condition of society; if not created by the wisest and
21
most favored, sanctioned and approved by them. '
Here, every member of society is a legislator; every
maxim, which by long usage acquires the force of law,
must have been stated, opposed, defended, adopted
by rulers and judges, slowly and at first timidly, but
so acceptable that all approve. If the custom be
of a more doubtful class, again debated, criticised,
denied, but finally confirmed and established. These
principles, after all, may not be wise and salutary
maxims; but they have all the wisdom that the
people of all classes (every man having precisely the
weight and influence he deserves,) can give them.
Farther advances in knowledge and experience
may demonstrate their unfitness and inutility;
212
then they will be modified, and silently changed.
209

See ELEANOR HOLMES PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY

IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC

210
211

212

4-12 (2011).

Id. at 24-26. See also MILLER, supra note 85, at 126-28.
It is worth pausing to note here that, following a path pioneered by Alexander
Hamilton and others, Smith's definition of "the common law" embraces much
more than judicial decisions, thereby giving a good deal of flexibility to its
advocates. See Kate Elizabeth Brown, Rethinking People v. Croswell: Alexander
Hamilton andthe Nature and Scope of "Common Law" in the Early Republic, 32 LAw &
HIST. REV. 611, 643-45 (2014). Justice Joseph Story took the same approach
in 1844, see The Common Law, in STORY supra note 207, at 3, 4.
See MORISON, supra note 205, at 428-29; REID, supra note 100, at 55. This
passage is quoted in LANGBEIN, LERNER & SMITH, supranote 199, at 497-98,

where the authors situate Smith as one of a large group of influential writers
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On the practical level, advocates undertook a sustained
campaign to promote their views. They created and taught in law
schools. 213 They wrote legal treatises. 214 They published their views
in speeches and essays directed to the public. 215 And they aggressively
promoted publication of judicial opinions 216 (including ones they
themselves had written) in an ultimately successful effort to overcome

of similar views, including Chancellor James Kent of New York; Joseph Story,
Isaac Parker, Theodore Sedgwick, and Theophilus Parsons of Massachusetts;
Jesse Root and Zepaniah Swift of Connecticut; George Wythe and Edmund
Pendleton of Virginia; William Gaston and Thomas Ruffin of North Carolina;
George Nicholas and John Breckinridge of Kentucky; Thomas McKean and
Alexander Dallas of Pennsylvania; and Henry William Desaussure in South
Carolina. Smith preceded the passage of the lecture quoted in the text with
words of praise for Parsons. See MORISON, supra note 205, at 427-28. As
indicated in the next paragraph of text, these advocates advanced their views
in multiple fora.
213 See Steven J. Macias, Book Review, 62 J. LEGAL EDUC. 367, 368-69 (2012)
(reviewing PEARSON, supra note 209); see generally Andrew M. Siegel, Note, "To
Learn andMake Respectable Hereafter": The Litchfield Law School in CulturalContext,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1978 (1998).
214 See DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND
THE TRANSFORMATION

OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

IN

THE ATLANTIC

277-79, 292, 294 (2005); see also John H. Langbein,
Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 570
(1993) (describing Kent and Story as "artists who worked in three media- the
published judicial opinion, juristic writing, and legal education.").
215 See, e.g., SWIFT, supra note 207. Jeremiah Smith reviewed anonymously the first
volume of the Massachusetts Reports for the Monthly Anthology and Boston
Review, a general interest literary magazine, devoting considerable effort to
the task. See MORISON, supra note 205, at 215-24; REID, supra note 100, at
157-69. The following year Daniel Webster reviewed the first volume of the
New York Reports for the same publication. See 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL
WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS 167-68, 172-74 (Alfred S. Konefsky &Andrew J.
King eds., 1982). Thereafter, he and other like-minded lawyers, including Caleb
Cushing, Joseph Story, and Henry Wheaton, reviewed volumes of published
law reports for the North American Review, a national literary magazine, see
REID, supra note 100, at 170. See generally Rowe, supra note 13, at 455-56 &
n.185 (establishing the authority of judiciary in the early Republic involved
"petitioning, parading, toasting, arguing to juries, printing newspaper invective,
and other uses of the public sphere," including the anonymous publication
of newspaper articles by Supreme Court Justices in defense of their judicial
opinions).
216 See Wilf, supra note 92, at 1686.
WORLD, 1664-1830, at
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the scarcity of printed law reports 217 and demonstrate that case law
218
could be made as accessible and transparent as statutory law.
The more law became understood as a science and its devotees
as scholars, the more judges were entitled to be respected as neutral
authorities rather than treated as just another group of political
actors,219 a powerful reason that increasingly "courts generally could
expect compliance with their mandates. 220
2. The Dangers of Democracy
Over time the orthodox Federalist view of the late 1780's that
the legislature on account of its very political responsiveness could
'
pose "a major threat to minority rights and individual liberties "221
that required a judicial counterweight 222 gained support as "large
numbers of influential people [became] increasingly disillusioned

217

See generally M.H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN ANTEBELLUM
11-27 (2010); MILLER,supranote 85, at 109; Freedman I, supranote
2, at 609 n.89 (collecting sources); John D. Gordan III,
PublishingRobinson's
Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the High Court of Admiralty, 32
LAW & HIST. REV. 525, 528-29 (2014).
218 See REID, supra note 91, at 211-12; William E. Nelson, The Province of the
Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 325, 333-35, 339, 342-43 (2004).
219 See Nelson, supra note 218, at 354-55 (explaining that establishment of judges'
power "rested upon their superior ability to research traditional professional
sources and thereby find pre-existing law" while acknowledging ultimate
democratic political control of the substance of the law, with the result that
"elite leaders and the common people felt comfortable that they were in
control."); Wood, supra note 80, at 804 (describing withdrawal of judges from
political activity). Reflecting the change, one study of journalistic accounts of
trials finds that as the century progressed lawyers' courtroom performances
were praised more for their legal analyses than for their ability to sway the
emotions of the jurors. See Simon Stern, Forensic Oratory and the Jury Trial in
Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 3 COMP. LEGAL HIST. 293 (2015).
AMERICA

220

NELSON,supra note

221
222

Wood, supra note 80, at 791.
See, e.g., LYNN W. TURNER, WILLIAM PLUMER OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1759185o, at 34-35 (1962); THE FEDERALIST, No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally, DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY,A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 22-28 (3d ed.
2013); David Grimsted, Rioting in itsJacksonianSetting, 77 Am. Hist. Rev. 361,
373 (1972).

108, at 95.
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with the kind of democratic legislative politics that was emerging in
'223
the early Republic.
3. The Decline of Legislative Adjudication
When the practice of legislative adjudication was challenged,
the courts sometimes prevailed in whole or in part.224 For example,
judicial opinions in Connecticut, 225 New Hampshire 226 and
Massachusetts 227 denied the validity of the practice, and seem to have
228
reduced if not entirely eliminated it.
Perhaps more significantly, legislatures found that holding
quasi-judicial proceedings - and, to their credit, they commonly
would hear from the parties when reviewing judicial rulings 229 - was a

223

Wood, supra note 80, at 807-08. See Timothy A. Lawrie, Interpretationand
Authority: Separation of Powers and the Judiciary'sBattle for Independence in New
Hampshire, 1786-1818, 39 AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 311 (1995).
224 For a survey see Treanor, supra note 105, at 508.
225 See Symsbury Case, 1 Kirby 444 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1785).
226 See Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818). For a full discussion of this case
and its judicial precursors see Lawrie, supra note 223. See also Freedman 1I,
supra note 3, at 17 n.51 (providing background on author of opinion).
227 The 1789 manuscript decision of the Supreme Judicial Court in Goddardv.
Goddard is documented in HAMBURGER, supra note 31, at 529.
228 See id. at 533; REID, supra note 99, at 167.
229 See, e.g., SWIFT, supra note 207, at 14-19; Freedman II, supra note 3, at 69
n.281. Cf REID, supra note 99, at 65 (noting that one of the rare instances of
a gubernatorial veto of an act overturning a New Hampshire judicial ruling
occurred when representatives had determined facts without being in a
position to do so).
For a description of the elaborate quasi-judicial procedures followed by the
New York provincial legislature of the early 1700's in adjudicating creditors'
claims against the government, see Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1381, 1472-74 (1998). The legislatures of North and South Carolina
during the colonial period seem to have delegated to the conduct of similar
proceedings to their committees. See id. at 1497-98 nn.568-69. During the
Articles of Confederation period, Congress found even this too burdensome
and created administrative agencies for the purpose. See Eric M. Freedman, Note,
The United States and the Articles of Confederation:Drifting Toward Anarchy or Inching
Toward Commonwealth?, 88 YALE LJ. 142, 157-58 (1978). So too, the first federal
court came into existence because the Continental Congress found that giving
admiralty litigants adequate process, even where the proceedings were only
appellate and delegated to a committee, see supra note 97, was an untoward call
on its resources. See Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The Revolutionary War Prize
Cases and the Origins ofDiversityJurisdiction,63 BUFF. L. REv. 477, 490-95 (2015).
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significant resource drain. 230 By 1832 the New Hampshire legislature
'23 1
had "vest [ed] the courts with full authority to grant equitable relief.
4. The Commercial Need for Predictability
As commercial transactions grew in size, complexity and
geographical scope, so too did the pressures for a legal regime in
which the participants could predict legal outcomes with a reasonable
degree of certainty. 232 "Businesses could not prosper in a legal
environment marked by the uncertainty of a legal system in which
decisions were based on... 'fairness.' ' 233 They needed a legal system
in which legally-knowledgeable decisionmakers ruled in accordance
with known principles. 234 Moreover, the constituency in favor of the
stability of property rights broadened as the diversification of the
economy led to increasing numbers of people being "caught up in
'235
buying and selling and creating new modem sorts of property.
5. The Election ofJudges
In addition, recent scholarship has emphasized that the
ongoing trend towards an elective judiciary helped reconcile "judicial
accountability to the people and judicial independence from the

230

231

232

233
234
235

See REID, supra note 99, at 66-69. The ruling inMerrill, 1 N.H. at 199, originated
with a request by the legislature to the Superior Court of Judicature for an
advisory opinion, and Professor Reid speculates that the request may have been
made because the lawmakers, "had reached the limits of their tolerance for the
time-consuming procedures they followed" in reviewing judicial rulings and
were hoping for a decision that gave them political cover to cease entertaining
such matters. See REID, supra note 91, at 19.
[Chief Justice] Frank R. Kenison, The Judiciary Under the New Hampshire
Constitution, 1776-1976, in NEW HAMPSHIRE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
BICENTENNIAL COMMISSION, THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTION 12, 13
(1977).
See Renee Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional
Rights to CivilJury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 828-29 & n.106
(2014). See also MILLER, supra note 85, at 133; Lawrie, supra note 223, at 319.
See generally Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1842).
HOEFLICH, supra note 217, at 24.
See id.
WOOD, supra note 80, at 459; see id. at 462-66 (discussing proliferation of
incorporated businesses).
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236

B. Jetsam: The Jury as Law-Pronouncer
The very factors just canvassed in Part IVA as strengthening
the judicial branch as against the others converged to weaken the
237
autonomy of the jury inside the court system.
Juries remained ignorant of the formal law even as judges
were becoming more knowledgeable about it.238 Juries were prone to
share transitory community passions and thus a source of instability
to minority and property rights alike. 239 And with the rise of an
elective judiciary, jurors no longer had inside the judicial branch the
comparative advantage of democratic legitimacy.
The result in general terms 240 was that by around 1830 or so,
"in civil cases . . . trial judges had successfully wrested control over
the law for themselves and confined jurors to finding the facts in a
'24 1
particular case."

236

SHUGERMAN,supra note

9, at 57; see Shugerman, supra note 100, at 1142. See
also Wood, supra note 80, at 794. For a discussion of the older scholarship see
Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanationsfor the Rise of the Elective
Judiciaryin Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 190 (1993).
237 See Kramer, supra note 69, at 101.
238 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of the CriminalJury
inthe United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 904-06 (1994); Tarr, supra note 81,
at 657. See also WOOD,supra note 80, at 453-55.
239 See Alshuler & Deiss, supra note 238, at 916-17; Lerner, supra note 232, at 82831. "The Schizophrenic Jury" of Professor Dubber's essay cited supra note 5
is one that is seen at some times and places as the idealistic representative
of community norms and a check on arbitrary government and at others as
an inefficient, arbitrary, prejudiced, and irrational decisionmaker. See Dubber,
supra note 5, at 3, 10, 13, 15-16. See generallyJeffrey Abramson, FourModels of
Jury Democracy, 90 CHI. KENT L. REV. 861 (2015); Jenny Carroll, The Jury as
Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825 (2015).
240 Specialists continue to debate the nuances of the timing and content of the
change - a debate that is likely to become more not less complex as more
historical studies covering additional jurisdictions and regions are completed but the overall narrative arc has been reliably established. See Larry D. Kramer,
The Pace and Cause of Change, 37J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357, 371-78 (2004).
241 ELIZABETH DALE, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1939,
at 30 (2011). The demise of the jury as the final word on the law in criminal
cases took longer, and is generally traced to Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S.
51 (1895). For an overview of developments during the period see DENNIS
HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE 117-46 (2016).
The independent role of the jury in criminal cases has spawned an enormous,
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V. Boumediene Defuses Bollman's Sea Mine
Boumediene v. Bush 242 is a case of monumental importance in
many dimensions, most of which are not relevant to the present
243
historically-focused survey.
For purposes of understanding its relationship to Bollman, the
case may be summarized quite simply. 244 After the Supreme Court
ruled in 2004 that the modern habeas corpus statute embodying
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789245 applied to prisoners detained
at Guantanamo Bay in pursuit of the "war on terror, '246 Congress
sought to overrule the decision by statute; that effort failed when

and often passionate, literature. A few recent contributions include Jonathan
Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. CH I. L.
REV. 1133 (2011); Jenny Carroll, Nullificationas Law, 102 GEo. LJ. 579 (2014);
Kenneth Duvall, The ContradictoryStance on Jury Nullification, 88 N.D. L. REV.
409 (2012); Monroe H. Freedman, Jury Nullification: What It Is, and How to do
It Ethically, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (2014); Thomas Regnier, Restoring the
Founders'Idealof the IndependentJury in CriminalCases, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
775 (2011); and Stacy P Eilbaum, Note, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The
Antiauthoritarianand AntimajoritarianHero and Villain in American Law and Legal
Scholarship, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 711 (2013).

242
243

244

245
246

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
In addition to raising a host of questions as to the validity of legal tactics the
federal government is deploying in its global struggle against terrorism, see, e.g.,
Mark D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, andLimitedGovernment,
59 DEPAuL L. REV. 851 (2010); Tim J. Davis, Comment, Extraterritorial
Application of the Writ of Habeas Corpus After Boumendiene: With Separation of
Powers Comes IndividualRights, 57 KAN. L. REV. 1199, 1231-33 (2009) (arguing
that, notwithstanding test grounded in individual rights employed by case
itself, focus on its checks-and-balances rationale supports conclusion that writ
extends to any detainee of executive branch "at any time and in any place"),
the opinion has significant implications for a variety of domestic questions. See
Gerald L. Neuman, The HabeasSuspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 537, 556-77 (2010). These include statutory restrictions on
the federal courts' habeas corpus examination of state criminal convictions, see,
e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, HabeasAfter Pinholster, 53 B.C. L. REV. 953, 994-96
(2012), and of immigration cases, see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus
and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 111-17 (2012).
The history set forth in the remainder of this paragraph of text has been well
summarized in Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of GuantanamoBay, 27 BE RKE LEY
J. INT'L. L. 1, 8-20 (2009).
28 U.S.C. 5 2241.
See Rasul v. Bush 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See generally Eric M. Freedman, Who's
Afraid of the CriminalLaw Paradigmin the "War on Terror"?, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV.
323 (2007).
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the Court ruled that the statute applied only prospectively, and thus
would not affect the hundreds of detainees who had habeas petitions
pending. 247 Congress responded by passing yet another statute, the
Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, to make its intentions
unmistakable. 24s The MCA amended the basic habeas corpus statute
to provide:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an
249
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
Such prisoners were to be relegated to a non-adversarial internal
review procedure conducted administratively by the Defense
Department with limited judicial review.2 50 Boumediene invalidated
the amendment under the Suspension Clause, leaving the petitioners
25 1
free to pursue habeas corpus under the historic writ.

247
248

249
250
251

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-77 (2006).
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 738 ("[W]e cannot ignore that the MCAwas adirect
response to Hamdan's holding that the [prior statute]'s jurisdiction-stripping
provision had no application to pending cases.").
28 U.S.C. 5 2241 (e)(1) (Supp. 2007).
See 28 U.S.C. 52242 (e) (2) (Supp. 2007). See also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 78392 (describing aspects of the procedure).
In seeking to actually do so, they encountered from all three branches of
government lawless stonewalling analogous to the "massive resistance" that
followed Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Muneeer I. Ahmad,
Resisting Guantanamo, 103 Nw. L. REV. 1683 (2009); JONATHAN HAFETZ,
Introduction to OBAMA'S GUANTANAMO: STORIES FROM AN ENDURING
PRISON Jonathan Hafetz ed., forthcoming 2016); Freedman, Past and
Present, supra note 15; see also Paola Bettelli, The Contours of Habeas Corpus after
Boumediene v. Bush in the Context of InternationalLaw, 28 N.Y. INT'L L. REV.
1, 22-23 (2015) (concluding that post-Boumediene developments have put
the United States in violation of international law). Although the underlying
Constitutional principles do not command the unanimity among the Justices
that existed in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958), there are both
practical and institutional reasons for the Court to respond. See generally
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (insisting on importance of principle that "the
political branches [not] have the power to switch the Constitution on or off
at will ... leading to a regime in which Congress and the President, not this
Court, say 'what the law is.' Marbury v. Madison") (citation omitted).

Eric M. Freedman

302

So stated, Boumendiene is not inconsistent with the precatory
Suspension Clause theory of Bollman.252 Congress had not done
nothing. It had passed a statute in 1789 that extended to these
prisoners. It repealed that statute by another in 2006. The Court
invalidated the repealing statute. The original statute resumed its
force. Nothing in the situation required the Court to exercise any
253
inherent habeas-granting authority.
Indeed, any statements Boumediene might make on that
question could be categorized as dicta. But Bollman's statements
on the subject were dicta too.254 Yet they remained a sea mine
threatening the writ's function "of judicially ferrying persons whom
the government, through restraints, has separated from their rights
under the Fundamental Law of the Land to the safe harbor afforded
''255
by that Law.
So the Court in Boumediene decided to defuse the sea mine.
In a "momentous ' 256 opinion resolving a question "that had not
received an authoritative answer for more than two centuries
into our nation's history, ' 257 the Court clearly announced that the
Constitution "affirmatively guarantees access to the courts to seek
the writ of habeas corpus (or an adequate substitute) in order to test
'
the legality of executive detention. "251
After presenting a historical account of habeas steeped in the
'259
"duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account,
252
253

254
255

See supra text accompanying note 191.
See Meltzer, supra note 192, at 20 (observing that there was no "need to consider
the more difficult situation in which the Suspension Clause applies but there
is no background congressional grant of federal court jurisdiction on which
to rely").
See supra text accompanying notes 183-86.
1 RANDY HERTZ

& JAMES

S. LIEBMAN,

FEDERAL HABEAS

CORPUS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5 2.3 at 29 (6th ed. 2011). See supra note 191.

256
257
258
259

See Meltzer, supra note 192, at 1, 58.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 1. This quote is set forth more fully infra note 267.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745. See id. at 742-46. The Court relied heavily on the
well-documented historical presentation in Halliday & White, supra note 7.
Indeed, the historical data unearthed by Professor Halliday and subsequently
presented in HALLIDAY, supra note 30, "drove Boumediene's result." Kovarsky,
supra note 15, at 759. This is of some significance because Halliday and White
quite explicitly questioned the soundness of a Bollman-based understanding
"that the source of the habeas privilege is exclusively statutory," and suggested
that it "should be re-considered." Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 683; see
also id. at 701.
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Boumediene determined that "the judicial authority to consider petitions
for habeas corpus relief" derives from principles "of separation of
powers. ' 26 0 (Of course, as the context makes clear, the Court is here
using the phrase "separation of powers" in the sense that I assigned
261
above to "checks and balances.")
262
The judiciary has the habeas power of inquiry and remedy
(including ordering release) 263 needed to effectively play its role in
policing the other branches. 264 As Boumediene thankfully makes clear,

260 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 ("Chief among [freedom's first principles] are
freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty
that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these
principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus
relief derives."). See Greenhouse, supra note 244, at 18 (describing opinion as
"among the Court's most important modern statements on the separation of
powers").
Scholars have uniformly emphasized the central importance of this aspect
of the opinion. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the
New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 466 (2010) (describing
Boumediene as "rooted in separation of powers and a concern about executive
manipulation of legal rules"); Katz, supra note 20, at 399-400 (arguing that
checks and balances basis of opinion supports broad rule "that Congress cannot
strip jurisdiction where doing so serves to shield Congress or the President
from judicial review in constitutional cases, giving the political branches the
last word on the constitutionality of their own actions"); Neuman, supra note
243, at 548-49; Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to The
Courts and Separationof Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2109-11 (2009)
(observing that case supports a view of habeas corpus that is "as much about
preserving the role of the courts as it is about protecting individual litigants").
261 See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
262 See Kovarsky, supra note 15, at 795 ("Boumediene specifically identifies two core
features of habeas power: the power to consider whether custody is lawful, and
the power to order discharge.").
263 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 ("We do hold that when the judicial power to
issue habeas corpus properly is invoked the judicial officer must have adequate
authority to make a determination in light of the relevant law and facts and
to formulate and issue appropriate orders for relief, including, if necessary,
an order directing the prisoner's release."); id. at 779 (stating that power to
order release is one of the "easily identified attributes of any constitutionally
adequate habeas corpus proceeding"). See also Freedman, Past andPresent, supra
note 15, at 40-41 (criticizing D.C. Circuit for subsequently defying this holding
in Kiyemba v. Obama, 553 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
264 It follows that in adjudicating habeas cases courts must employ procedural
mechanisms, e.g., discovery, that are sufficient for this purpose, regardless
of whether those procedures existed at common law, are made available by
statute, or conform to the wishes of the jailers. See generally Azmy, supra note
260, at 524-37; Marc D. Falkoff, Back to Basics: HabeasCorpus Proceduresand Long-
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this is true regardless of whether Congress has (1) passed a statute
restricting the power (the actual situation in Boumediene) or (2) failed
to pass one granting the power (the hypothetical posed by Bollman) .265
(1). The issue actually before the Court arose under the
Suspension Clause, which is a limit on the power of Congress to pass
a statute like the MCA. That is why the Court explicitly grounded its
holding invalidating the Act in the Suspension Clause.2 66
(2). But the broader proposition - the modern dicta
supporting an inherent judicial habeas power which destroyed
the older dicta rejecting it - does not originate in the Suspension
Clause. 26 7 That proposition rests on Article 111.268 The Court in 2008
unmistakably if silently 26 9 accepted the argument that Harper had
made unsuccessfully on behalf of Bollman in 1807:270 "[T] he power of
issuing writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of relieving from illegal

265

266
267

268

269
270

Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961 (2009); Garrett, supra note
243, at 100-08; Wiseman, supra note 243, at 993-97.
See Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas and the Separation of Powers, 95
IoWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 52-54 (2010) (explaining why Constitutional rule
of Boumediene is that Suspension Clause protects common law habeas corpus
"whether Congress has provided for it or not").
See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739, 746, 771.
But cf Meltzer, supra note 192, at 1 ("[T]the Supreme Court ...clearly held
... that the Constitution's Suspension Clause, despite its indirect wording,
affirmatively guarantees access to the courts to seek the writ of habeas
corpus (or an adequate substitute) in order to test the legality of executive
detention.") (footnote omitted); id. at 17 ("[T]he Court's holding that the
Suspension Clause confers an affirmative right to habeas relief has not received
the attention it deserves."); id. at 30 ("Also correct, and of more fundamental
importance, is the holding that the Suspension Clause affirmatively guarantees
the right to habeas corpus review"); Neuman, supra note 243, at 541 (stating
holding in Boumediene, which "should make us all breathe easier": "The
Suspension Clause ...permanently requires a right to habeas corpus, with
certain minimum content, when the writ has not been suspended.").
This argument has been made fully and rigorously in the wake of Boumediene by
Kovarsky, supra note 15, at 754-86, 810. It was sketched out prior to Boumediene
by Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a StructuralRight, 62 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 275, 277-78, 283-84, 302-05 (2008).
Boumediene makes only one entirely glancing reference to Bollman. See Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 779.
Perhaps Harper would have appreciated the thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes
that the law offers to its practitioners "the secret isolated joy of the thinker,
who knows that, a hundred years after he is dead and forgotten, men who
never heard of him will be moving to the measure of his thought - the subtile
rapture of a postponed power, which the world knows not because it has no
external trappings, but which to his prophetic vision is more real than that
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imprisonment, is one of those inherent powers, bestowed by the law
upon every superior court of record, as incidental to its nature, for
271
the protection of the citizen.
The inherent authority to grant writs of habeas corpus in the
absence of a valid suspension is one of the attributes of the "judicial
power" that Article III grants. 272 By embracing that proposition
Boumediene defused the two-century-old Bollman dicta, effacing them
from the U.S. Reports before they could do any harm. But the Court
did more. It re-defined the basis of its own habeas corpus authority in
a way that recognized the writ as an instrument for the enforcement
of checks and balances. Those two aspects of Boumendiene make it "an
'273
occasion for dancing in the streets.
They represent critical lessons about habeas corpus that the
present has learned from the past and should bequeath to the future:
"[T] he practice of arbitrary imprisonment[] [has] been, in all
'274
ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.
It oppresses the individual of course. But it also undermines the
cathedral of government under law that the legal system of the United
States is continuously seeking to construct. And that is true whether
the fault lies with the legislature, the executive or both, 275 and

which commands an army."
Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
271

272
273

274
275

OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Professionof the
PAPERS 29, 32 (1920).

See supra text accompanying note 155. For a recent consideration of inherent
judicial powers, see Alexander Volokh, The Inherent Powers Corollary:Judicial
Non-Delegation and FederalCommon Law (Aug. 7, 2015) (unpublished research
paper, Emory University School of Law) (on file at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 2638490).
See Kovarsky, supranote 15, at 804.
Cf. Harry Kalven, Jr. The New York Times Case:A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the FirstAmendment," 1964 S. CT. REV. 191, 208, 221 n.125 (agreeing with
assessment of Alexander Meiklehohn that, quite part from its doctrinal
contributions to libel law, the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 24 (1964) was "an occasion for dancing in the streets" both because
it definitively determined the unconstitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798,
1 Stat. 586, and because it put that insight at the heart of the meaning of the
First Amendment).
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 744 (quoting this passage).
The judicial branch, too, may be responsible for wrongful imprisonments, but
Boumediene did not present that problem and this article has put it to one side.
See supra notes 30, 178.
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whether their misuse of power consists of action or inaction. 276 The
independent power of the judicial branch to grant habeas corpus in
the absence of a valid suspension both restores liberty to the person
who was arbitrarily deprived of it and strengthens the government
structures that ought to have prevented the deprivation in the first
place.

276

27 7

Cf. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906) (upholding criminal contempt
proceedings against sheriff who stood aside and let mob lynch prisoner
notwithstanding pending federal habeas corpus proceedings, rejecting defense
that sheriff might have thought no habeas jurisdiction existed); United States v.
Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909) (upholding guilty verdict against sheriff following
criminal trial held before Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction);
Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt, ABA J., June 2, 2009, http://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/a supremecase of contempt (last visited
Aug. 9, 2015) (describing case as "a pivotal turning point in asserting the
importance of the rule of law and the need for an independent judiciary").
For a book-length account see MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR.,
CONTEMPT

OF

COURT:

THE TURN-OF-CENTURY

LYNCHING

THAT

(1999), and for a shorter
one see Doug Lindner, The Trial of SheriffJoseph Shipp et al.: An Account, http://
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/shipp/trialaccount.html (last visited
Aug. 9, 2015).
277 See Freedman I, supra note 2, at 618.
LAUNCHED A HUNDRED YEARS OF FEDERALISM

